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ALL OF THIS HAS HAPPENED BEFORE 
AND ALL OF THIS WILL HAPPEN AGAIN:1 
INNOVATION IN COPYRIGHT LICENSING  
Rebecca Tushnet † 
ABSTRACT 
Claims that copyright licensing can substitute for fair use have a long history. This 
Article focuses on a new cycle of the copyright licensing debate, which has brought revised 
arguments in favor of universal copyright licensing. First, the new arrangements offered by 
large copyright owners often purport to sanction the large-scale creation of derivative works, 
rather than mere reproductions, which were the focus of earlier blanket licensing efforts. 
Second, the new licenses are often free. Rather than demanding royalties as in the past, 
copyright owners just want a piece of the action—along with the right to claim that 
unlicensed uses are infringing. In a world where licenses are readily and cheaply available, the 
argument will go, it is unfair not to get one. This development, copyright owners hope, will 
combat increasingly fair use–favorable case law. 
This Article describes three key examples of recent innovations in licensing-like 
arrangements in the noncommercial or formerly noncommercial spheres—Getty Images’ 
new free embedding of millions of its photos, YouTube’s Content ID, and Amazon’s Kindle 
Worlds—and discusses how uses of works under these arrangements differ from their 
unlicensed alternatives in ways both subtle and profound. These differences change the 
nature of the communications and communities at issue, illustrating why licensing can never 
substitute for transformative fair use even when licenses are routinely available. Ultimately, 
as courts have already recognized, the mere desire of copyright owners to extract value from 
a market—especially when they desire to extract it from third parties rather than licensees—
should not affect the scope of fair use. 
 
 1. See Battlestar Galactica (NBC Universal Television 2004–2007; Universal Media 
Studios 2007–2009).  
  © 2014 Rebecca Tushnet. 
 †  Professor of Law, Georgetown University. Thanks to Julie Cohen for helpful 
comments. 
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I. INTRODUCTION: REBOOTING LICENSING? 
Claims that copyright licensing can substitute for fair use are nothing 
new. Among other iterations, they’ve been made on behalf of the dream of a 
“celestial jukebox” that would charge audiences anew for each enjoyment of 
a copyrighted work,2 and on behalf of large publishers hoping to be paid for 
each photocopy of a journal or newspaper article.3 This Article focuses on a 
new cycle of the copyright-licensing debate, which has brought revised 
arguments in favor of universal copyright licensing. First, the new 
arrangements offered by large copyright owners often purport to sanction (or 
is it tolerate?4) the large-scale creation of derivative works, rather than mere 
reproductions, which were the focus of earlier blanket licensing efforts. 
Second, the new licenses are often free, and may even offer opportunities for 
 
 2. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE 
CELESTIAL JUKEBOX (rev. ed. 2003). 
 3. See Cambridge Univ. Press v. Becker, 863 F. Supp. 2d 1190 (N.D. Ga. 2012). 
 4. See Tim Wu, Tolerated Use (Columbia Law Sch. Law & Econ. Working Paper Grp., 
Paper No. 333, 2008). 
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licensees to profit. Rather than demanding royalties as in the past, copyright 
owners just want a piece of the action—along with the right to claim that 
unlicensed uses are infringing. In a world where licenses are readily and 
cheaply available, the argument will go, it is unfair not to get one.5 
These new attempts to expand licensing in ways that take into account 
the new digital economy and the rise of “user-generated content” face a fair 
use doctrine that is in some ways less favorable to copyright owners than it 
was several decades ago, when a few key decisions supported the rise of 
(allegedly) blanket reproduction licenses.6 Even then it was plain that 
copyright owners’ desire to license had the potential to make the “effect on 
the market” factor of fair use analysis weigh inevitably in favor of a plaintiff 
because a copyright owner operating a licensing scheme could simply assert 
that it would have received a licensing fee had the defendant not made its 
unauthorized use. Courts ruling in copyright owners’ favor stated that the 
presence of a licensing scheme wasn’t dispositive, but then proceeded as if it 
was.7 
Subsequently, courts developed a few tools to limit the circularity of the 
licensing argument. Many cases say that a foregone license fee should only be 
considered in “traditional, reasonable, or likely to be developed” markets.8 
Another way of explaining the limit looks to the underlying justification for 
fair use: that some uses of copyrighted works shouldn’t be under the 
copyright owner’s control, because sometimes freedom serves copyright’s 
 
 5. Other countries currently without fair use are facing the same questions. See 
AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMM’N, ALRC REPORT 122, COPYRIGHT AND THE DIGITAL 
ECONOMY 50 (2014) (“A key issue in this Inquiry is whether unremunerated use exceptions 
should apply ‘if there is a licensing solution’ applicable to the user. On one view, ‘in 
principle, no exception should allow a use that a user can make under a licensing solution 
available to them.’ ”) (citing submission by Copyright Agency/Viscopy). 
 6. A few key decisions supported a broad preference for licensing over fair use in 
photocopying and coursepacks. See Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., 
Inc., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 
913 (2d Cir. 1994); Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
 7. See Am. Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 913; Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F.3d at 1401 
(Martin, C.J., dissenting). 
 8. E.g., Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170, 1179 (9th Cir. 2013); Bill Graham 
Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 614 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Am. 
Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 930); Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 
1282 (11th Cir. 2001); Núñez v. Caribbean Intern. News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 25 (1st Cir. 
2000); American Institute of Physics v. Schwegman, Lundberg & Woessner, P.A., Civil No. 
12-528 (RHK/JJK), 2013 WL 4666330, at *13 (D. Minn. Aug. 30, 2013); Kane v. Comedy 
Partners, No. 00 Civ. 158(GBD), 2003 WL 22383387, at *6–7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2003), 
aff’d, 98 F. App’x 73 (2d Cir. 2004). 
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goals of encouraging creation and dissemination of expression better than 
centralized control. Recent decisions have explicitly held that, even if 
copyright owners would like to license “transformative” uses—uses that 
provide new meanings and messages—of their works, these uses aren’t 
within the scope of their rights, and failure to receive a license fee for 
transformative uses therefore can’t be counted as a harm.9 
While copyright owners have lost some significant cases in court, they are 
trying to change the facts on the ground to achieve many of the same 
benefits that they could get from a legally established right to license 
transformative uses.10 Once again, copyright owners are claiming that 
licensing is always the answer, and that every use of an expressive work 
should involve a commercial transaction. For example, the Harry Fox 
Agency, a musical-work licensing organization, claims that “licensing is just 
the first step in a process intended to result in accurate payment by users to 
songwriters and music publishers for each and every use of their songs.”11 To 
these rights-owners, fair use is expropriation: “[L]egalizing the unauthorized 
use of preexisting material triggers a form of class warfare between 
appropriation artists and original artists. Instead, public policy should 
incentivize and promote collaboration between appropriation and original 
artists, including the voluntary licensing requirement that is at the core of the 
free marketplace collaborative relationship.”12 
 
 9. See, e.g., Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, No. 12-4547-cv, 2014 WL 2576342, at 
*9–10 (2d Cir. June 10, 2014); SOFA Entm’t, Inc. v. Dodger Prods., Inc., 709 F.3d 1273 (9th 
Cir. 2013); Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 615 (2d Cir. 
2006); Nat’l Ctr. for Jewish Film v. Riverside Films LLC, No. 5:12-cv-00044-ODW(DTBx), 
2012 WL 4052111 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2012); Warren Publ’g Co. v. Spurlock, 645 F. Supp. 
2d 402 (E.D. Pa. 2009). 
 10. See James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 
YALE L.J. 882, 899–903 (2007) (discussing effect of licensing on development of copyright 
law). 
 11. NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN., REQUEST FOR COMMENTS ON DEPARTMENT 
OF COMMERCE GREEN PAPER, COPYRIGHT POLICY, CREATIVITY, AND INNOVATION IN 
THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, NO. 130927852-3852-01, POST-MEETING COMMENTS OF THE 
HARRY FOX AGENCY, INC. 4 (Jan. 23, 2014), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/
the_harry_fox_agency_inc._post-meeting_comments.pdf (emphasis added); see also NAT’L 
TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN., REQUEST FOR COMMENTS ON DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE. 
GREEN PAPER, COPYRIGHT POLICY, CREATIVITY, AND INNOVATION IN THE DIGITAL 
ECONOMY, WRITTEN COMMENTS OF COPYRIGHT CLEARANCE CENTER, INC. 7 (Nov. 13, 
2013), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/copyright_clearance_center_ 
comments.pdf (advocating for a pay-per-use system and arguing that “if you do get rights 
right, the market then changes,” meaning that licensing should take over). 
 12. NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN., REQUEST FOR COMMENTS ON DEPARTMENT 
OF COMMERCE GREEN PAPER, COPYRIGHT POLICY, CREATIVITY, AND INNOVATION IN 
THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, NO. 130927852-3852-01, REPLY COMMENTS OF ASCAP ET AL. 3 
 
1447-1488_TUSHNET_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/12/15  5:42 PM 
2014] INNOVATION IN COPYRIGHT LICENSING 1451 
This Article describes three key examples of recent innovations in 
licensing-like arrangements in the noncommercial or formerly 
noncommercial spheres—Getty Images’ new free embedding of millions of 
its photos, YouTube’s Content ID, and Amazon’s Kindle Worlds—and 
discusses how uses of works under these arrangements differ from their 
unlicensed alternatives in ways both subtle and profound. These differences 
change the nature of the communications and communities at issue, 
illustrating why licensing can never substitute for transformative fair use even 
when licenses are routinely available.  
The innovations I will examine attempt to get Internet users accustomed 
to light, rarely visible supervision by copyright owners of uses that are 
individually low-value but may be valuable in the aggregate in the form of 
direct income or of monetizable data on consumer behavior. While there’s 
room in the copyright ecosystem for these innovations, it would be a grave 
mistake to conclude that the problem of licensing has finally been cracked 
and that fair use can now, at last, retreat to a vestigial doctrine. Ultimately, as 
courts have already recognized, the mere desire of copyright owners to 
extract value from a market—especially when they desire to extract it from 
third parties rather than licensees—should not affect the scope of fair use.13 
This conclusion is even more appropriate where, as here, these schemes 
don’t actually require monetary payment from users, the way previous 
generations of true licensing did. These aren’t ordinary buyer/seller markets, 
and they won’t be. Because this principle is already present in copyright law, I 
hope it will prove easier to defend than it has been to fend off some other 
expansive copyright claims.14 But the argument will regularly need to be 
reasserted, because no matter what the law says, some copyright owners will 
perennially seek to replace fair use with a right to collect for every exposure 
to their works. 
 
(2013), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/ascap_bmi_cmpa_nsai_nmpa_riaa_ 
sesac_post-meeting_comments.pdf (footnote omitted); see also id. at 3 (“As a practical matter, 
the digital licensing ecosystem in place today is much better than in the past and will only 
continue to improve going forward. The contractual deal points in digital sample licenses 
have become standardized and are relatively easy to negotiate.”) (footnote omitted). 
 13. See supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text. 
 14. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (approving copyright term 
extension); Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012) (approving copyright restoration of 
foreign works previously in the public domain). 
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II. THERE ARE MANY COPIES, AND THEY HAVE A PLAN: 
THREE EXPERIMENTS IN LICENSING OR NEAR-
LICENSING 
This Part offers a detailed look at three examples of large-scale attempts 
to control and monetize, rather than suppress, previously unauthorized 
online uses. As I will argue, these attempts are not replacements for fair use, 
because the project of monetization and control requires significant changes 
in practice. My examples work across different genres—photography for 
Getty Images; music and video for YouTube’s Content ID; and books and 
videogames for Amazon’s Kindle Worlds. Regardless of the genre, the 
aspirations of copyright holders are the same. They aim not just to put the 
genie of frictionless copying back into the bottle, but also to make it start 
granting their wishes. 
As a result, certain themes will recur throughout this discussion: the 
systems’ abilities to suppress uses deemed unacceptable by copyright owners; 
their expansive and potentially invasive data collection; and their 
concentrating effect on markets for expressive works. The first theme—the 
suppression of unpopular uses—is routinely a stated concern of fair use 
doctrine. The fact that a copyright owner may try to prevent uses it 
disapproves of on noneconomic grounds is an important reason to have fair 
use protections.15 But while the second and third themes, erosion of privacy 
and effects on market competition, are not explicitly part of most copyright 
analyses,16 I will suggest that they too help explain why pervasive licensing 
should not limit fair use, and why the presence of such licensing even 
increases the need for a broad fair use doctrine. Pervasive control and 
surveillance shape what people create and imagine themselves creating, and a 
dominant intermediary can harm individual creators. Thus, even someone 
only concerned with authors should consider privacy and competition 
relevant to copyright policy. 
Each of these themes deserves careful consideration, especially when 
pervasive licensing is presented as a substitute for fair use. The themes are 
tightly intertwined: control via large-scale licensing invites the exercise of 
power to keep certain viewpoints and uses off-limits; it enables and generates 
 
 15. See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of 
the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982). 
 16. Software copyright cases do regularly consider competition issues, because software 
is so often functional, but otherwise the concept rarely arises. As for users’ privacy, it is more 
often a looming concern that is not explicitly considered. See Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling 
Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2591 (2009) (explaining how fair use can support 
privacy). 
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returns from extensive data mining; and it assists with controlling whole 
market structures in addition to individual works. Proponents of pervasive 
licensing (or near-licensing) describe it as a way to embrace online cultures 
while generating a profit, instead of attempting in vain to suppress all 
unauthorized uses. But as one commentator on Kindle Worlds noted, 
“[e]mbrace is always enclosure! The industry’s arms are made of fences!”17 
Once individual participants are penned in, they can be counted, marked, 
moved around, and cut out of the herd (to be shorn, or even to be 
slaughtered if they’re more trouble than they’re worth). 
A. GETTY IMAGES: PICTURE-PERFECT CONTROL 
Getty Images is the youngest of the three regimes I will discuss, and its 
contours are thus less developed. However, its aspirations are as great—to 
control, monitor, and monetize ordinary online image uses. Getty recently 
made thirty-five million images available for automatic, payment-free use.18 
Uses must be “noncommercial,” which Getty defines to include standard 
reporting such as that found in the New York Times. Getty seems to mean 
something like “noncommercial according to the First Amendment,” which 
means that the uses must not propose a commercial transaction.19 Users 
must embed the images using Getty’s proprietary code, which means that 
they are not actually copying the image—they are simply linking to an image 
hosted by Getty itself.  
To lump this initiative in with “licensing” is to give Getty much more 
than may first appear. In the United States, linking to an image hosted 
elsewhere does not constitute a direct exercise of any exclusive right 
 
 17. Mel Stanfill, Kindle Worlds, Part 1: The Economic Raw Deal, MELSTANFILL.COM (May 
27, 2013, 12:00 PM), http://www.melstanfill.com/kindle-worlds-part-1-the-economic-raw-
deal/. 
 18. Olivier Laurent, Getty Images Makes 35 Million Images Free in Fight Against Copyright 
Infringement, BRITISH JOURNAL OF PHOTOGRAPHY (Mar. 5, 2014), http://www.bjp-
online.com/2014/03/getty-images-makes-35-million-images-free-in-fight-against-copyright-
infringement/ [hereinafter 35 Million Images]. 
 19. See id. (explaining that Getty considers ad-supported blogs and editorial websites, 
including the New York Times and Buzzfeed, to be noncommercial; a license is only required 
“if they used our imagery to promote a service, a product or their business”); cf. Olivier 
Laurent, 10 Facts You Need to Know About Getty Images’ Embed Feature, BRITISH JOURNAL OF 
PHOTOGRAPHY (Mar. 6, 2014), http://www.bjp-online.com/2014/03/10-facts-you-need-to-
know-about-getty-images-embed-feature/ [hereinafter 10 Facts] (“However . . . the image 
library doesn’t believe these news websites will want to feature an embed player with Getty 
Images’ branding in their design, especially since the player cannot be resized. Plus, later on, 
Getty Images will feature ads in its player, which would compete with news organisations’ 
own advertising models.”). 
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protected by copyright.20 This remains true even if the hypertext markup 
language employed to embed the image makes the image appear to a user as 
if it was a seamless part of the linker’s webpage.21 Even in Europe, with its 
far more restrictive rules, unauthorized linking to an image lawfully present 
on a website doesn’t infringe the copyright owner’s rights.22 If the image is 
itself infringing, there might be secondary liability under U.S. law for linking 
to it in certain circumstances; but if a site hosts the image with the 
permission of the copyright owner, there can be no liability, since there’s no 
primary infringement. As a result, what Getty is doing isn’t “licensing” any 
copyright rights at all. Getty is using various technological measures to make 
it difficult to embed images without using Getty’s proprietary code,23 and so 
users are getting something out of the deal, but they are not getting a 
copyright license. However, Getty presents its move as a way of recognizing 
the inevitability of the circulation of images online while moving today’s 
countless unauthorized, purportedly infringing speakers into the space of 
copyright licensing.24 
1. Technical Tethering 
Getty’s control over embedded images is near total—it limits potential 
uses in many ways that fair use does not. While its consumer-facing website 
promises that “[o]ur new embed feature makes it easy, legal, and free for 
anybody to share our images on websites, blogs, and social media platforms,” 
Getty in fact reserves the right to demand that any particular use stop at any 
time.25 According to Getty’s terms, Getty embeds may only be used in 
relation to “events that are newsworthy or of public interest,” and they may 
 
 20. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1160–61 (9th Cir. 
2007); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 21. See Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1161. 
 22. See Case C-466/12, Nils Svensson v. Retriever Sverige (Feb. 13, 2014), available at 
http://curia.europa.eu (choose desired language, then search for case number C-466/12). 
 23. Circumventing those technological measures might implicate the quasi-copyright 
rights conferred by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) § 103(a), 17 U.S.C. § 
1201 (2012). 
 24. Joshua Brustein, Since It Can’t Sue Us All, Getty Images Embraces Embedded Photos, 
BUSINESSWEEK (Mar. 6, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-03-06/since-
it-cant-sue-us-all-getty-images-embraces-embedded-photos/ (“Anyone can now visit 
[Getty’s] website, grab some embed code, and display an image on blogs and social media 
pages without paying a licensing fee. . . . The problem of purloined images is too big to solve 
on a lawsuit-by-lawsuit basis. . . . People are inevitably going to display images publicly on 
blogs and social media feeds, so the only way to remain relevant is to provide them with a 
viable legal alternative.”).  
 25. Embed Images, GETTY IMAGES, http://www.gettyimages.com/Creative/Frontdoor/
embed/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2014) (emphasis added). 
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not be used “in a defamatory, pornographic or otherwise unlawful manner,” 
limitations governed by Getty’s own interpretations.26  
This control is more than contractual—it is artistic. A Getty embedded 
image cannot be resized, edited, or cropped for editorial purposes;27 it may be 
removed or changed at any time, leaving holes in a user’s work; and Getty 
may run ads over it. All of these limits make a Getty embed a very different 
artifact, expressively speaking, from an image that is not tethered 
technologically. A Getty embed can’t be Photoshopped; it can’t be turned 
into a meme;28 it can’t, in other words, be put into circulation in terms of 
meaning. It can be seen, but not shared. It therefore lacks many of the 
distinctive features of digital remix culture. The multiple variations that 
evolve on sites like Tumblr and Know Your Meme depend on freedom to 
edit, crop, and alter. This flexibility is an underappreciated aspect of current 
infrastructure, but one that Getty embeds make more salient. Getty’s control 
suppresses the mutability of images that is important to the creation and 
transmission of meaning online.29 
 
 26. Terms of Use, GETTY IMAGES, http://www.gettyimages.com/Corporate/Terms.aspx 
(last updated Mar. 2014). 
 27. Laurent, 10 Facts, supra note 19 (“The embed player has a width of 594 pixels and a 
height of 465 pixels. It cannot be resized. It includes the image, without a watermark, with 
the name of the photographer and the collection, plus Getty Images’ logo. This information 
cannot be removed.”). As a result, a Getty embed does not show up as a thumbnail image in 
various contexts, such as when a post using a Getty embed is shared on Facebook. 
 28. See generally LIMOR SHIFMAN, MEMES IN DIGITAL CULTURE (2013) (discussing 
memes as transmissible and, crucially, reconfigurable units of culture); Ronak Patel, First World 
Problems: A Fair Use Analysis of Internet Memes, 20 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 235 (2013) (arguing that 
memes are fair use). 
 29. See Patel, supra note 28, at 252: 
[Image-based memes] advance culture. They are a system of explaining 
events by reducing them to a simple and well-known joke. Their fast 
dissemination, imitation, and mutation causes them to become cultural 
phenomena that are recognizable not because of the underlying works, 
but because of the meme itself. This is significant because, while a single 
meme in and of itself cannot cause cultural advancement, it is not the 
meme itself that is important, but the fact that memes provide more 
avenues of expression, thus increasing the chance that a message can be 
transmitted to someone in an effective way. In other words, when society 
and intellectual property laws allow memes to develop, the arsenal of 
means of expression to the average Internet originator—and to those 
referring to memes in regular conversation in order to elucidate their 
argument—expands. 
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2. Effortless Data Gathering 
One digital innovation is central to a Getty embed: pervasive automated 
monitoring. Consistent with the expansionist dreams of Big Data, Getty will 
collect information on how each image is used and who is using and viewing 
it. Getty intends “to utilise that data to the benefit of our business.”30 
Although Getty hasn’t figured out an advertising model, that just makes 
Getty more determined to make the program pay somehow, perhaps by 
using the data to determine what types of images Getty photographers 
should be creating in the future.31 It’s this very uncertainty about how 
monetization might ultimately be accomplished that makes control of all the 
data seem so valuable. While the shift to centralization seems to require little 
in return from users (for example, screen real estate that allows Getty to run 
ads), this move towards tracking every interaction fits well into what Julie 
Cohen calls the “surveillance-innovation complex”:32 apparent crowd-
friendliness in rhetoric conceals and legitimates architectures of control, 
diminishing privacy in the name of technological innovation and convenient 
(but not free) speech. As Cohen presciently noted, tighter copyright controls 
of this sort presume, and require, the elimination of readers’ and viewers’ 
privacy.33 Getty will be able to track not only the people using its embeds, but 
also the readers of those people’s posts, whose computers will be 
communicating directly with Getty’s. 
3. Market Control 
In a final theme that will be echoed in the remaining examples, Getty 
would like to control the platform, with all that potentially lucrative data. It is 
interested in “shar[ing]” its embed feature with other content creators, 
 
 30. Laurent, 35 Million Images, supra note 18 (quoting Craig Peters, senior vice president 
of business development, content, and marketing at Getty Images). 
 31. Id. (“The stock agency will also use the data it will draw from the player to perfect 
its collections. ‘We’ll be working with the creative and editorial teams at Getty Images to 
better understand how our imagery is being used and how they can better create imagery’ 
[says a Getty representative].”). Getty’s terms of service provide that it may share all the 
information it collects with third parties, without limitation. Terms of Use, supra note 26 
(“Getty Images (or third parties acting on its behalf) may collect data related to use of the 
Embedded Viewer and embedded Getty Images Content . . . .”). 
 32. See generally Julie E. Cohen, The Surveillance-Innovation Complex, BALKINIZATION (Mar. 
11, 2014, 11:03 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/03/the-surveillance-innovation-
complex.html.  
 33. See, e.g., JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, 
AND THE PLAY OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE 155–86 (2012) (discussing the relationship 
between copyright enforcement and architectures of control and surveillance online); Julie E. 
Cohen, DRM and Privacy, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 575 (2003). 
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presumably by licensing it to other image copyright owners for a cut of the 
proceeds.34 Operating in a highly fragmented market, such a licensing scheme 
will only benefit certain participants.35 Moreover, Getty photographers are 
not allowed to opt out of the program, in the service of constructing the 
largest possible database.36 It may not be surprising, therefore, that various 
photography organizations reacted with some disquiet to the new program, 
seeing it as a measure that might benefit Getty, but would not put money in 
the pockets of individual photographers.37 
B. GOOGLE’S CONTENT ID: LICENSING THIRD PARTIES, NOT 
CREATORS 
Google’s Content ID for YouTube is a massive undertaking in which 
copyright owners register works of video and audio with YouTube, and 
Google scans uploaded video for video and audio matches. When a match 
(including a partial match, where only some of the upload contains video or 
audio in the Content ID database) is found, a copyright owner can choose to 
run ads on the uploaded video without the permission of the uploader.38 
 
 34. Laurent, 35 Million Images, supra note 18. 
 35. See NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN., REQUEST FOR COMMENTS ON 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE GREEN PAPER, COPYRIGHT POLICY, CREATIVITY, AND 
INNOVATION IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, NO. 130927852-3852-01, COMMENTS OF 
DEVIANTART 28 (Nov. 13, 2013), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/
deviant_art_comments.pdf [hereinafter DEVIANTART NTIA COMMENTS] (“There are very 
few licensing agents even for top line commercial artists such as professional photographers 
and graphic artist[s] working at the peak of their profession. The assumption that the work 
of these artists flows to corporate owners who can act as surrogates is false. Most works in 
the visual arts are not works made for hire. Licensing of these works remains non-uniform.”) 
(footnotes omitted). 
 36. Laurent, 35 Million Images, supra note 18. 
 37. Olivier Laurent, Industry Concerned About Getty Images’ Free-for-All Approach, BRITISH 
JOURNAL OF PHOTOGRAPHY (Mar. 7, 2014), http://www.bjp-online.com/2014/03/
industry-concerned-about-getty-images-free-for-all-approach/. 
 38. In Google’s words: 
Rightsholders deliver to YouTube reference files (these can be audio-only 
or video) of content they own, metadata describing that content, and 
policies describing what they want YouTube to do when it finds a match. 
Rightsholders can choose between three policies when an upload matches 
their content: 1) make money from them (for monetized videos the 
majority of the revenue goes to rightsholders); 2) leave them up and track 
viewing statistics; or 3) block them from YouTube altogether. Content ID 
compares videos uploaded to the site against those reference files, 
automatically identifies the content, and applies the rightsholder’s 
preferred policy. 
NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN., REQUEST FOR COMMENTS ON DEPARTMENT OF 
COMMERCE GREEN PAPER, COPYRIGHT POLICY, CREATIVITY, AND INNOVATION IN THE 
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Content ID participants, in fact, have many choices. If they don’t want to run 
ads, they can just block uploads that include content matches. Or they can 
block full uploads (e.g., a complete song) while monetizing or allowing 
shorter clips. Revenue splits are possible if the uploader is trying to monetize 
her stream, or the copyright claimant may demand all the money. The 
Content ID claimant may also choose to block the video if the uploader is 
trying to monetize her own uploads, but not block the video and just run ads 
on it if she’s not. 
According to Google, as of 2014, more than five thousand entities use 
Content ID, including “major US network broadcasters, movie studios and 
record labels,” with more than twenty-five million reference files in Google’s 
database.39 More than 200 million videos have been claimed through Content 
ID,40 leading to the allocation of hundreds of millions of dollars in ad 
revenue.41 Indeed, Content ID claims make up one-third of monetized 
YouTube views.42 According to the recording industry itself, it is “making 
more money from fan-made mashups, lip-syncs and tributes on YouTube 
than from official music videos.”43 
What this means in terms of marketers’ access to data on their audiences 
remains to be seen, or more likely unseen.44 Data collection underlies 
Google’s increasingly successful monetization of YouTube. To the extent 
that centralized commercial “sharing” platforms replace other sources for 
video—including individual webpages and cloud storage services—privacy 
interests will be profoundly affected. Google aggregates video-watching data, 
search data, email, and other information about users for its own commercial 
benefit, and YouTube is a vital part of that strategy, even if the revenues 
have to be shared with copyright owners. 
 
DIGITAL ECONOMY, NO. 130927852-3852-01, COMMENTS OF GOOGLE 3 (Nov. 13, 2013), 
available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/google_comments.pdf [hereinafter GOOGLE 
NTIA COMMENTS]. 
 39. Statistics, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/yt/press/statistics.html (last visited 
May 4, 2014). 
 40. GOOGLE NTIA COMMENTS, supra note 38, at 4. 
 41. Statistics, supra note 39. 
 42. GOOGLE NTIA COMMENTS, supra note 38, at 4. 
 43. Joel Eastwood, Recording Industry Earns More from Fan Videos than from Official Music 
Videos, THESTAR.COM (Mar. 18, 2014), http://www.thestar.com/entertainment/music/
2014/03/18/recording_industry_earns_more_from_fan_videos_than_from_official_music_
videos.html. 
 44. Google’s deep pockets, which allowed it to create Content ID and to negotiate 
deals with major content owners, depend on integrating data across its platforms. YouTube 
is a piece of its data collection and an increasingly important one. The scanning, data 
analysis, and large scale of Content ID are a part of what makes privacy concerns so salient 
online. 
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As much as major copyright owners hate Google,45 they are enthusiastic 
about hailing Content ID as a technology that will obviate the need for fair 
use. In a Green Paper released in 2013, the government suggested that 
Content ID could provide a model for “less risky” licensing alternatives to 
fair use.46 Many copyright owners interpret “less risky” to mean “appropriate 
substitute for.”47 Even the Association of American Publishers, which 
doesn’t represent copyright owners who own works Content ID can 
recognize, touted Content ID as evidence that there was no need for any 
legal solicitude for remixing.48 Google’s limited success in identifying songs 
 
 45. It is hard to fully document the visceral distaste for the search giant that I have 
seen expressed by representatives of major copyright owners, though reading through the 
Green Paper comments cited herein might give a bit of the flavor. They don’t like that 
Google makes money from the existence of their content, one way or another, and they 
don’t like that Google continues to index search results that allow users who are looking for 
unauthorized streams or downloads to find them, even though it also takes down millions of 
infringing results. Without mentioning Google specifically, Jessica Litman has given a general 
description of the climate of distrust and anger that surrounds much copyright discourse 
(though she might well think I’m contributing to it). See generally Jessica Litman, The Politics of 
Intellectual Property, 27 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 313 (2009). 
 46. Copyright Policy, Creativity, and Innovation in the Digital Economy, DEPARTMENT OF 
COMMERCE INTERNET POLICYY TASK FORCE 29 (July 2013), available at http://
www.uspto.gov/news/publications/copyrightgreenpaper.pdf (identifying Content ID as 
“[p]articularly promising” because it enabled users to make remixes, not just copies). 
 47. See, e.g., NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN., REQUEST FOR COMMENTS ON 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE GREEN PAPER, COPYRIGHT POLICY, CREATIVITY, AND 
INNOVATION IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, NO. 130927852-3852-01, COMMENTS OF 
MOTION PICTURE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA 5 (Nov. 13, 2013), available at http://
www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/motion _picture_association_of_america_comments.pdf 
[hereinafter MPAA NTIA COMMENTS] (discussing both Content ID, labeled “Content 
Management System” by the MPAA, and Kindle Worlds as appropriate frameworks for 
licensing remixes); NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN., REQUEST FOR COMMENTS ON 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE GREEN PAPER, COPYRIGHT POLICY, CREATIVITY, AND 
INNOVATION IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, COMMENTS OF NATIONAL MUSIC PUBLISHERS’ 
ASSOCIATION 3–4 (Nov. 13, 2013), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/
national_music_publishers_association 
_et._al._comments.pdf (“[T]he authors of all ‘derivative works’—including mash-ups, 
remixes, and those works incorporating digital samples—must always license the pre-existing 
material (both sound recordings and underlying musical compositions) because there is a 
viable commercial marketplace in existence for the licensing of these works . . . .”) (emphasis 
added); NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN., REQUEST FOR COMMENTS ON DEPARTMENT 
OF COMMERCE GREEN PAPER, COPYRIGHT POLICY, CREATIVITY, AND INNOVATION IN 
THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, NO. 130927852-3852-01, COMMENTS OF RECORDING INDUSTRY 
OF AMERICA, INC. 6–7 (Nov. 13, 2013), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/
recording_industry_association_of_america_comments.pdf (claiming that licensing through 
YouTube is a flexible response to new uses). 
 48. NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN., REQUEST FOR COMMENTS ON DEPARTMENT 
OF COMMERCE GREEN PAPER, COPYRIGHT POLICY, CREATIVITY, AND INNOVATION IN 
THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, NO. 130927852-3852-01, COMMENTS OF ASSOCIATION OF 
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and video is now being offered as evidence that automated procedures 
“generally” can identify copyrighted works of all kinds across the entire 
Internet.49 As with Getty Images, however, Content ID’s architectures of 
control serve particular private interests, not the copyright system as a whole. 
Content ID’s limitations are both practical and conceptual, and greater 
reliance on Content ID in lieu of fair use would harm freedom of expression 
and increase Google’s market dominance, to the detriment of creativity. 
1. The Heavy Hand of Automatic Control: No Filters for Fairness 
Like Getty Images, Content ID doesn’t involve typical copyright licenses. 
Content ID is an arrangement with Google, not with individual uploaders, 
who don’t receive any rights.50 Even if Content ID is a license, it is not a 
blanket license. Content ID participants retain the right, and often exercise 
the power, to suppress uses they don’t like—precisely the uses that are most 
likely to be critical, uncomfortable, or otherwise transformative.51 
Because Content ID does not require claimants to disclose their rules for 
what content will be blocked or monetized, it’s hard to identify traditional 
attempts to suppress disfavored viewpoints. The censor’s hand, however, 
operates even when it operates lightly. Content ID always allows the claimant 
to choose its preferred treatment of an identified work. And this explicit 
control is joined by the more subtle shaping of culture that occurs when 
 
AMERICAN PUBLISHERS 2 (Nov. 13, 2013), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/ 
association_of_american_publishers_comments.pdf (arguing that remix culture doesn’t need 
specific legal protection because “there is clear evidence that content and technology 
companies are working together on this issue to create market solutions, such as YouTube’s 
Content ID system”). 
 49. Notice and Takedown Provisions under the DMCA § 512: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Courts, Intellectual Prop., & the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 6–7 (2014) 
(testimony of Sean M. O’Connor, Professor of Law and Founding Director, Entrepreneurial 
Law Clinic, University of Washington (Seattle)), available at http:// www.judiciary.house.gov/
?a,=Files.Serve&File_id=F87934CD-04E2-4A6F-84DF-01CB91919B63 (“We know that 
Content ID and other systems are reasonably effective at identifying copyright works 
generally.”). 
 50. See DEVIANTART NTIA COMMENTS, supra note 35, at 29 n.72 (“The greatest 
drawback of the YouTube process is that copyright owners license YouTube only. The 
license does not ‘pass through’ to the user who generated the work and who may have 
created a derivative work. The user remains an infringer while the redistribution becomes 
licensed.”). 
 51. See, e.g., Katie Allen, Google Seeks to Turn a Profit from YouTube Copyright Clashes, THE 
GUARDIAN (Nov. 1, 2009), http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2009/nov/01/google-
youtube-monetise-content/ (reporting that video content owners block about 20% of 
detected uses “for reasons such as a user piggybacking on footage to push their own website 
or because the use does not fit the original’s values,” for example when the original is “a 
family brand” and the use isn’t family-friendly). 
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remix artists internalize the limits imposed by copyright owners and avoid 
certain music or other content that is always blocked on YouTube, sacrificing 
better artistic results in order to keep their work available on a broader 
platform. 
Unsurprisingly, one result of Content ID’s affordances is that copyright 
owners suppress messages that aren’t acceptable to them. Jonathan McIntosh 
created a remix that criticized the Twilight series for its regressive gender 
stereotypes, and found his work blocked because he refused, on moral 
grounds, to allow the copyright owner of Twilight to profit from his work. In 
other words, the owner used Content ID suppress criticism. McIntosh’s 
work was ultimately restored, but his situation was unusual because he 
managed to get enough publicity and legal assistance to establish that his 
work was protected by fair use.52 In another reported case, a noncommercial 
video analyzing remix culture and copyright law, which used clips from a 
viral remix video that itself combined a song with video clips from John 
Hughes films, was taken down as a result of a Content ID claim. The 
creator’s appeal was “rejected,” despite Google’s promise that an appeal of a 
Content ID determination would force the claimant to resort to the DMCA 
process.53 Google’s contracts with some Content ID partners even allow 
them to override DMCA counternotifications, lifting from copyright owners 
the burden of filing suit to challenge uses that uploaders would be willing to 
litigate to defend.54 
Content ID can directly conflict with copyright’s incentive system. To 
the extent that a video has copyrightable elements that aren’t owned by the 
claimant, the claimant has no legal right to exploit those elements. Although 
it might have the right to remove the video, that is different from having the 
right to monetize it; Content ID allows the latter as the price of not 
removing the work, even if the video isn’t an infringing derivative work but is 
instead a fair use. In such cases, claimants are appropriating noninfringing 
 
 52. NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN., REQUEST FOR COMMENTS ON DEPARTMENT 
OF COMMERCE GREEN PAPER, COPYRIGHT POLICY, CREATIVITY, AND INNOVATION IN 
THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, COMMENTS OF ORGANIZATION FOR TRANSFORMATIVE WORKS 
(“OTW”) 72–73 (Nov. 13, 2013), available at http:// www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/
organization_for_transformative_works_comments.pdf [hereinafter OTW NTIA 
COMMENTS]. 
 53. Mike Masnick, Video About Fair Use, Remix & Culture Taken Down Over Copyright 
Claim (Of Course), TECHDIRT.COM (Nov. 8, 2012, 7:27 AM), http://www.techdirt.com/
articles/20121107/18062520968/video-about-fair-use-remix-culture-taken-down-over-
copyright-claim-course.shtml. 
 54. See Google, Videos Removed or Blocked Due to Youtube's Contractual Obligations, 
GOOGLE. COM, https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/3045545/ (last visited Aug. 
14, 2014). 
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copyrighted works for their own benefit—something that in other contexts 
the same claimants are very happy to call “piracy.” 55 Copyright owners have 
used Content ID to control revenues from standard reviews and reporting—
classic fair uses even when done for profit—funneling money away from the 
creators of those reviews.56 One reviewer points out that he’s now forced to 
choose between the quality of his review, which often depends on illustrating 
a point with evidence, and his ability to earn a living.57  
Separately, there are numerous reports of misidentification and abuse of 
Content ID by claimants who don’t even have legitimate claims to 
components of user-uploaded videos.58 Major rightsholders, such as the 
Harry Fox Agency (which licenses musical works), assert rights over works 
that are plainly in the public domain.59 In order to dispute such invalid 
 
 55. See Mona Ibrahim, Deconstructing Let’s Play, Copyright, and the YouTube Content ID 
Claim System: A Legal Perspective, GAMASUTRA.COM (Dec. 12, 2013, 1:16 PM), http://
www.gamasutra.com/blogs/MonaIbrahim/20131212/206912/
Deconstructing_Lets_Play_Copyright_and_the_YouTube_Content_ID_Claim_System_A_
Legal_Perspective.php. 
 56. Owen Good, Game Critic Says YouTube Copyright Policy Threatens His Livelihood 
[Update], KOTAKU.COM (Dec. 12, 2013), http://kotaku.com/game-critic-says-youtube-
copyright-policy-threatens-his-1482117783/ (reporting that Content ID has deprived a 
videogame critic of the ability to earn ad revenue from his videogame reviews and 
interviews, thus threatening his livelihood). 
 57. Id. 
 58. See, e.g., Tim Cushing, Copyright Killbots Strike Again: Official DNC Livestream Taken 
Down By Just About Every Copyright Holder, TECHDIRT.COM (Sept. 5, 2012, 1:32 AM), http://
www.techdirt.com/articles/20120904/22172920275/copyright-killbots-strike-again-official-
dnc-livestream-taken-down-just-about-every-copyright-holder.shtml (reporting that 
automated content protection measures suppressed a stream of an awards show because 
officially licensed clips from Dr. Who were present, but the automated system couldn’t 
detect the licensing; the same thing happened to the Democratic National Convention’s 
official channel, on behalf of multiple copyright claimants); Owen Good, The Most Ridiculous 
Victim of YouTube’s Crackdown is a BASIC Game, KOTAKU.COM (Dec. 17, 2013), http://
kotaku.com/the-most-ridiculous-victim-of-youtubes-crackdown-is-a-1484998183/ (“This 
guy just got flagged for a playthrough video of a game. A game he programmed.”); Ben 
Jones, Why YouTube’s Automated Copyright Takedown System Hurts Artists, TORRENTFREAK.COM 
(Feb. 23, 2014), http://torrentfreak.com/ why-youtubes-automated-copyright-takedown-
system-hurts-artists-140223/ (arguing that Content ID ignores fair use and allows multiple 
claims; one artist explains: “It is up to me to prove myself innocent by asking eighteen 
different publishing companies through an automated system to revoke the automated 
claims. Each publisher has a month to reply, with no obligation to even do so. If even one of 
the eighteen publishers says ‘nope’ then it’s back to square one . . . . Any financial loss or 
restrictions on my channel are entirely on me, and will not be compensated for once the 
claim is lifted.”). 
 59. See Mike Masnick, Harry Fox Agency Claims Copyright Over Public Domain Work By 
Johann Strauss, TECHDIRT.COM (Nov. 6, 2012, 10:02 AM), https://www.techdirt.com/
articles/20121102/13164120919/harry-fox-agency-claims-copyright-over-public-domain-
work-johann-strauss.shtml; Chris Morran, YouTube’s Content ID System Will Take Away Your 
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claims, individual users have to know enough law to be willing to face down 
a large entity. Abusive claimants may well simply reinstate a claim after a 
challenge, as Harry Fox did with the 164-year-old Radetzky March by Johann 
Strauss. Even an invalid claim can prevent a legitimate uploader from 
monetizing a work for thirty days.60  
Though Google has made efforts to improve the transparency of the 
claiming process, there are still frequent reports of problems, and, unlike a 
fair use assertion that can ultimately be litigated, a Content ID rejection is 
unreviewable. The automated nature of Content ID can lead to extreme 
frustration, since creators may be unable to reach a human with responsibility 
for a decision.61 It is likely that the percentage of troublesome Content ID 
determinations is quite low. But because the volume of uploads to YouTube 
is so large, even a small percentage of problematic “matches” can translate 
into large absolute numbers, and fair uses are disproportionately likely to be 
found in that population, since fair uses that involve quoting audio or video 
will produce Content ID matches. 
Commendably, Google acknowledges that Content ID is not a substitute 
for fair use. Google notes that even an endeavor with the scale of Content 
ID simply can’t keep up with the massive volume of copyrighted content 
online.62 Further, even if an automated system could identify every 
 
Money If You Dare Sing “Silent Night,” CONSUMERIST.COM (Dec. 26, 2013), http://
consumerist.com/2013/12/26/youtubes-content-id-system-will-take-away-your-money-if-
you-dare-sing-silent-night/ (“YouTuber Adam ‘The Alien’ Manley ran up against the idiocy 
of Content ID twice in the last week, with multiple music publishers claiming that his recent 
rendition of ‘Silent Night’ violated their copyright, in spite of the fact that the song, an 
English version of a nearly 200-year-old German Christmas carol . . . has been in the public 
domain for more than a few years.”). 
 60. See Morran, supra note 59 (“When a monetized video is flagged, YouTube takes 
away the ads and therefore any money that clip would be earning, which would be fine if 
Content ID weren’t such a tin-eared agent bent in favor of the recording industry.”). 
 61. Owen Good, YouTube’s Copyright Crackdown: Everything You Need To Know, 
KOTAKU.COM (Dec. 18, 2013), http://kotaku.com/youtubes-copyright-crackdown-simple-
answers-to-compli-1485999937/ (“When people are told they are violating a law or a rule, 
they expect to be able to confront or reason with the enforcer of that rule or the person 
they’ve wronged, however unwittingly. With a YouTube scanning program making these 
calls on behalf of others, who sometimes aren’t aware of the claims made in their name, it 
can be very hard to get someone on the line to hash things out.”). 
 62. GOOGLE NTIA COMMENTS, supra note 38, at 4 (“As an initial matter, Content ID 
will never include reference files for every copyrighted work that might be included in every 
remix uploaded to the site. While Content ID currently has over 15 million reference files in 
its database, that represents a tiny fraction of all the audio, video, and imagery that falls 
within the scope of copyright. In other words, no matter how comprehensive Content ID’s 
database of reference files may one day become, there will always be an important role for 
fair use when it comes to remixes on YouTube.”). 
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copyrighted work, it couldn’t identify which were fair uses. Content ID 
doesn’t analyze transformativeness, the amount of the work taken, or other 
fair use factors. Google recognizes that a copyright owner who hasn’t chosen 
to use Content ID to monetize uploads could simply block a fair use, or an 
owner could monetize an upload despite having no right to do so.63 As 
Google notes, “[t]he second case can be particularly galling to a remix creator 
whose fair use video is intended as a criticism or parody of the rightsholder 
or work in question.”64 Google contends that it offers procedures to 
ameliorate these problems,65 but they still rely on users understanding and 
exercising their fair use rights in the face of a complex and often-changing 
process that doesn’t seem to work as well in practice as Google claims it 
does.66 
2. Competition: Crowding Out Smaller Creators and Newer Intermediaries 
Content ID’s reliance on a private company’s technology and self-
interest, instead of on copyright law, creates other systemic issues. Content 
ID, like Getty Images, has anticompetitive elements, both in terms of 
creators and in terms of intermediaries. On the creator side, only large 
aggregators who own the rights to popular content are entitled to use 
Content ID: “[t]o be approved, [copyright owners] must own exclusive rights 
to a substantial body of original material that is frequently uploaded by the 
YouTube user community.”67 To those who have, more is given.68 Smaller 
 
 63. Id. at 5. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id.; id. at 5 n.10 (explaining the dispute and appeal process). 
 66. Google also suggests that rightsholders should adopt best practices to prevent 
overclaiming; it does not contend that rightsholders routinely follow this advice. Id. at 5–6. 
Still, Google’s modest conclusion is that “intermediary licensing can be a pragmatic, 
efficient, scalable solution to some of the legal uncertainties facing some remix creators with 
respect to some copyrighted works. These kinds of content identification and licensing 
systems should be viewed as a supplement to other mechanisms, such as fair use and ‘best 
practices’ efforts . . . [to] facilitate noninfringing forms of remix creativity.” Id. at 6 (footnote 
omitted). 
 67. How Content ID Works, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/
2797370?hl=en (last visited May 4, 2014). In addition, for understandable reasons, Google 
requires Content ID participants to have exclusive rights to their works—people who make 
remixes or derivative works that could otherwise be commercialized still can’t use Content 
ID, nor can people who use Creative Commons noncommercial licenses. Qualifying for 
Content ID, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/1311402 (last visited 
May 4, 2014). 
 68. Individual artists may occasionally qualify for Content ID, but they don’t make 
much money from it. Independent musician Zoë Keating explained: “I had about 2 million 
views in 2013 but nearly all of them are 3rd party videos. If I choose to monetize them I get, 
I think, 35% of the revenue share (the total revenue share being 55% to the copyright 
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entities can send DMCA takedown notices, but they can’t use Content ID to 
monetize or otherwise take advantage of the virality of their works on 
YouTube. Moreover, Google has recently suggested that it will block videos 
from musicians who refuse to sign up with its new subscription streaming-
media service and who want to continue to rely on advertising instead, 
meaning that popular “indie” artists such as Adele could be excluded.69 
(Google seems to hope that Chris Anderson was right when he argued that 
free content could be used as a gateway drug: “[p]eople will pay if you make 
them (once they’re hooked).”70) Though such musicians could still send 
DMCA notices, they might not be able to use Content ID without signing a 
broader deal with Google.71 Although it’s not clear how this subscription 
service will affect remix videos posted by third parties,72 what is clear is that 
Google is already using its growing power to shape the music video market. 
On the intermediary side, licensing schemes presuppose that some larger 
entity will negotiate with rightsholders, given that individual users have 
neither the knowledge nor the ability to negotiate licenses. Yet most sites 
 
holders and 45% to Google). Given that, 3rd party videos will never amount to much. In my 
case I think of the 6,565 videos Youtube CMS has found so far, 90% of them are smalltime 
dance performances, rehearsals, films, art projects etc.” Zoë Keating Puts Her Revenue Figures 
Into Perspective, HYPEBOT.COM (Mar. 3, 2014), http://www.hypebot.com/hypebot/2014/03/
zo%C3%AB-keating-puts-her-revenue-figures-into-perspective.html. Keating also objects to 
the fact that she can’t control the ads that will run when she opts to monetize using Content 
ID; they include ads for products she doesn’t support. Id. Because the backlash from fans 
when their videos are claimed isn’t worth the small amount of money she receives, Keating 
has decided to end monetization of her works and instead target only commercial film, TV, 
and advertising uses. Id. 
 69. See Ben Popper, Youtube Will Block Videos from Artists Who Don’t Sign Up for Its Paid 
Streaming Service, THE VERGE (June 17, 2014), http://www.theverge.com/2014/6/17/ 
5817408/youtube-reportedly-block-videos-indie-artists/. 
 70. CHRIS ANDERSON, FREE 242 (2009). 
 71. See Sandra Aistars, Why Are Artists Disappearing from the Internet?, THE HILL (June 24, 
2014), http:// thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/technology/210113-why-are-artists-disappearing 
-from-the-internet/ (reporting that “[r]umors are that those who do not accept YouTube’s 
take-it-or-leave-it licensing deal for its new streaming service will be barred from offering 
their own channels on YouTube and prevented from using tools like Content ID to identify 
their music when it is posted by others without authorization,” though ignoring the DMCA 
when claiming that this scheme means that unauthorized, infringing versions will stay up so 
that Google alone can profit). 
 72. A leaked version of the contract appears to include “User Video with Provider 
Sound Recording” in the list of content to which Google will have the ability to apply its 
new subscription rules, which would cover many common forms of remix, but how this 
would work in practice is not yet public. See Paul Resnikoff, F*&K It: Here’s the Entire 
YouTube Contract for Indies . . . , DIGITAL MUSIC NEWS (June 23, 2014), http://www.digital 
musicnews.com/permalink/2014/06/23/fk-heres-entire-youtube-contract-indies/. 
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can’t afford the investment required to create a Content ID–like system. As 
the visual art site DeviantART explained: 
YouTube’s content identification system . . . is very complex and 
very expensive. It requires registration of works, digital 
fingerprinting and a constant review and frequent interdiction of 
incoming user generated content. . . . It hopefully goes without 
saying that very few enterprises can afford this approach. The 
technology required to (i) store metadata, (ii) identify works at 
nanosecond speeds, (iii) seamlessly execute on permission sets after 
identification, (iv) place advertising inventory in front of the work 
and finally (v) generate a revenue share payment to the copyright 
owners reflects a level of engineering excellence also beyond the 
reach of most enterprises.73 
Google itself has argued that its system is not an appropriate model for 
the Internet in general, pointing out that Content ID’s development was 
incredibly expensive (costing approximately thirty million to sixty million 
dollars)74 and resource-intensive, requiring more than 50,000 engineering 
hours.75 Startup competitors couldn’t replicate it.76 
Moreover, YouTube’s Content ID is a system put in place by a currently 
dominant market participant. But we do not know what markets will look 
like in ten years. YouTube hasn’t yet been around for a decade. To conclude 
that current intermediaries have solved the problem of licensing poses 
significant risks on both sides. On the one hand, the licensing model risks 
entrenching YouTube’s near-monopoly on the market because other 
competitors do not have access to the same licensed content.77 As we’ve seen 
with the nightmare that is digital-radio licensing, new entrants can rarely cut 
 
 73. DEVIANTART NTIA COMMENTS, supra note 35, at 28–29 (footnote omitted). 
 74. GOOGLE NTIA COMMENTS, supra note 38, at 4 (“more than $30 million”); Hearing 
on S. 512 of Title 17 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop., and the Internet of the H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 6 (2014) (testimony of Katherine Oyama, Senior Copyright 
Policy Counsel, Google Inc.), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/_cache/files/be93d452-
945a-4fff-83ec-b3f51de782b3/031314-testimony---oyama.pdf  [hereinafter Testimony of 
Katherine Oyama] (“more than $60 million”). 
 75. GOOGLE NTIA COMMENTS, supra note 38, at 4. 
 76. See Testimony of Katherine Oyama, supra note 74 (“YouTube could never have 
launched as a small start-up in 2005 if it had been required by law to first build a system like 
Content ID.”). 
 77. Cf. Jeff Macke, E-Book Ruling Cements Amazon’s Virtual Monopoly, YAHOO 
FINANCE—BREAKOUT (July 11, 2013), http://finance.yahoo.com/blogs/breakout/e-book-
ruling-cements-amazon-virtual-monopoly-150844210.html (noting Amazon’s increasing 
monopoly over e-book content). 
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the same deals as earlier ones.78 On the other hand, YouTube could go the 
way of AOL’s walled garden, Blackberry, MySpace, AltaVista, and many 
other formerly dominant digital entities, and its licensing “solutions” will 
decline and fall with it. Whether or not Google is too big to fail, its present 
existence shouldn’t be used to delegitimize fair use. 
Content ID is a successful monetization model for large copyright 
owners of popular online video content. But it is not, despite those owners’ 
claims, an appropriate substitute for fair use generally. It gives some 
copyright owners too great an ability to suppress disfavored uses, leaves 
other owners (including fair users) out in the cold, and hands Google too 
much power to structure creative markets. 
 
C. KINDLE WORLDS: PAID TO PLAY? 
Recently, Amazon’s Kindle Worlds has been added to Content ID as 
major copyright owners’ proof of concept that licensing is always available, 
and that all creativity should be monetized.79 Kindle Worlds content is 
 
 78. See, e.g., Rick Marshall, The Quest for “Parity”: An Examination of the Internet Radio 
Fairness Act, 60 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 445 (2013) (examining some of the multiple 
different licensing regimes applicable to entities based on their size, technologies, and 
whether they existed in 1998). 
 79. See NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN., REQUEST FOR COMMENTS ON 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE GREEN PAPER, COPYRIGHT POLICY, CREATIVITY, AND 
INNOVATION IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, NO. 130927852-3852-01, COMMENTS OF 
COPYRIGHT ALLIANCE 5 (Nov. 13, 2013), available at https://copyrightalliance.org/
sites/default 
/files/final_copyright_alliance_iptf_reply_comment.pdf (arguing that licensing “demonstrates a 
vibrant and legal market for remixes,” including Kindle Worlds, which allows “creators of 
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available only through Amazon’s website. The program builds on and 
distorts the concept of “fan fiction,” new unauthorized stories written by 
fans (or sometimes anti-fans) of an existing copyrighted work.80 Online, fan 
fiction circulates noncommercially. In Kindle Worlds, by contrast, both 
author and copyright owner receive payment when a reader buys a Kindle 
Worlds ebook, as does Amazon. This makes it the most directly monetized 
of the new semi-blanket, semi-licensing initiatives. Relatedly, it’s the most 
limited in terms of participation. Most content owners are still nervous about 
“letting” other people make money using their works.81 Moreover, extensive 
participation by film and television properties is unlikely, given standard 
 
fan fiction to easily make commercially profitable uses of the underlying works”); MPAA 
NTIA COMMENTS, supra note 47, at 5 (same). Another author has confidently asserted that 
Kindle Worlds precludes a fair use defense for fan fiction, at least for non-sexually explicit 
fan fiction, showing a serious but unsurprising misunderstanding of fair use doctrine:  
By licensing fan-fiction publication rights to Amazon, Alloy adds Kindle 
Worlds to the “potential market” considered in fair use’s fourth factor 
(“the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work”). As free fan-fiction would naturally (and negatively) 
impact a market, a court is likely to find that this factor favors the 
copyright owner, Alloy. 
Arguably, fan-fiction rated R and NC-17 should be excluded here, given 
that Kindle Worlds’ . . . “Content Guidelines” prohibit “[p]ornography” 
and “[o]ffensive [c]ontent ” . . . . Ergo, sites featuring only blue fan-fiction 
do not impact the same market(s) as their unobscene peers. 
Hence, Kindle Worlds gives Alloy and Amazon an incentive to seek 
damages and the shutdown of free fanfiction sites . . . , and places the 
odds of winning firmly in their favor. Over time, fear of large damage 
awards and litigation costs would likely lead to voluntary site shutdowns 
and the gradual extinction of free fan-fiction. 
And thus, what is currently an impetus to pay for fan-fiction could 
become a necessity . . . .  
Sarah Katz, Amazon Kindle Worlds: Fan-Fiction’s New Normal, SCREEN INVASION (May 29, 
2014), http://screeninvasion.com/2014/05/amazon-kindle-worlds-fan-fictions-new-normal. 
 80. See Rebecca Tushnet, Legal Fictions: Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law, 17 
LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 651 (1997). 
 81. For another recently announced example of allowing “fans” to share in some 
material benefits from monetization, see Hasbro’s very small line of authorized My Little Pony 
“fan art” sculptures, now available for purchase.  SUPERFANART.COM (last visited Aug. 14, 
2014). The five authorized artists there represent a tiny fraction of My Little Pony fan artists 
and sculptors, most of whom would never make the cut. For example, it’s impossible to 
imagine Hasbro licensing Mari Kasurinen, who makes My Little Pony mashups with other 
pop icons from Alien to the X-Men. See Angela Watercutter, Gallery: Iron Man, Other Pop Icons 
Become My Little Pony Sculptures, WIRED (Sept. 1, 2011), http://www.wired.com/2011/09/my-
little-pony-pop-icons/?viewall=true (explaining that Kasurinen’s work addresses materialism, 
individualism, children’s socialization through toys, and how people use custom objects to 
show status). 
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Writers’ Guild of America contracts requiring payment to the writers of the 
initial scripts.82 Thus, participation in Kindle Worlds is restricted to hand-
picked franchises, rather than huge blocks of corporate-owned content. The 
fan fiction generated by the broader universe of popular TV shows and 
movies, which are generally the most popular inspirations for fan fiction, 
must continue to rely on fair use. 
1. Control: Building the Fence and Culling the Herd 
Even if Kindle Worlds could license every popular media property, it 
would remain highly constrained, and would not substitute for 
transformative fair uses. The language of control and exploitation 
predominates even in favorable descriptions of Kindle Worlds. Fans are raw 
material, resources to be exploited, and data to be mined.83 Reflecting these 
perceptions of fan authors, Kindle Worlds is a bad deal for creators 
compared to other forms of commercial authorship (which are not known 
for their massive payouts in the first place).84 Kindle Worlds authors give up 
many more rights than conventional authors.85 Fifty Shades of Grey, the 
bestselling erotic novel that began as Twilight fan fiction, provides an 
instructive contrast. While there are questions surrounding the book’s 
transition from fanwork to paid work,86 and while some fans of the fan 
fiction series felt exploited by the author’s use of their enthusiasm to convert 
 
 82. See Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright Society: Fan Productions, REBECCA TUSHNET’S 
43(B)LOG (June 9, 2014, 3:20 PM), http:// tushnet.blogspot.com/2014/06/copyright-
society-fan-productions.html (reporting comments of Matt Bloomgarden, VP Business & 
Legal Affairs, Alloy Entertainment/Warner Bros. Television). 
 83. See, e.g., Alexandra Alter, ‘Vampire Diaries’ Writer Bites Back, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 17, 
2014), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304058204579495491652398358/ 
(“Now, entertainment companies are searching for new ways to make money off fan writing 
and harness the next potential breakout hit. . . . ‘At the very least, it’s additional promotion, 
and in the best-case scenario, there are ideas for new properties that we can mine’ [the 
president of a major Kindle Worlds participant said].”). 
 84. Alter, supra note 72 (“Amazon grants fan-fiction writers 35% of net revenue for 
works that are 10,000 words or longer, and 20% of revenue for shorter works. But that’s 
much smaller than the 70% of royalties that a self-published author can get for an original 
work published through Amazon.”); Francesca Coppa, Fuck Yeah, Fandom is Beautiful, 2 
J. FANDOM STUD. 73, 80 (2014) (stating that Kindle Worlds is “inserting itself into the 
process by which some fans become professionals, and potentially taking a cut of those 
creative works large enough to stop most people from making a living at it”). 
 85. See Alter, supra note 83 (quoting Francesca Coppa, an English professor at 
Muhlenberg College, who says, “It feels like a land grab. . . . Big companies are trying to 
insert themselves explicitly to get people who don’t know any better to sign away rights to 
things that might be profitable.”). 
 86. Bethan Jones, Fifty Shades of Exploitation: Fan Labor and Fifty Shades of Grey, 15 
TRANSFORMATIVE WORKS & CULTURES (2014), available at http://journal. 
transformativeworks.org/index.php/twc/article/view/501/422. 
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her work into a commercial success, it’s notable that the economic payoff for 
Fifty Shades was far greater than that available through Kindle Worlds. By 
“filing off the serial numbers” and converting the story into one that no 
longer starred Bella and Edward from Twilight, but rather a more generic 
insecure young woman and powerful older man, the writer E.L. James was 
able to become the world’s highest-earning author, keeping a much larger 
percentage of her earnings than available through Kindle Worlds.87 In 
addition, she was able to sell the movie rights, something else Kindle Worlds 
doesn’t allow. 
Kindle Worlds may be fandom’s “Sugarhill moment,” in Abigail 
DeKosnik’s words: “the moment when an outsider takes up a subculture’s 
invention and commodifies it for the mainstream before insiders do.”88 
DeKosnik’s prescient words evoke what happened to rap music, where a 
relatively few people made millions of dollars, but many of them didn’t come 
from the communities that originated the form; instead, rap musicians were 
integrated into the large-scale commercial music system, and rarely saw much 
economic benefit from it.89 
With commercial exploitation comes a lack of creative freedom. Even 
more explicitly than Getty Images or Content ID, Kindle Worlds has serious 
content restrictions. To begin, Amazon bans the popular “crossover” genre, 
in which characters or settings from one world intersect with another. Sex 
and violence are, naturally, risky topics. Although Amazon is coy about the 
limits of its ban on sexually explicit content—it wouldn’t want to lose out on 
the next Fifty Shades of Grey—Amazon retains broad discretion to police the 
appropriateness of content. It appears that, in light of Amazon’s history of 
suppressing gay and lesbian content and “kinky” content,90 explicit sexuality 
is more likely to survive if it is otherwise conventionally heterosexual. And 
because Amazon maintains tethered control over “purchased” copies, any 
work may be pulled or edited for causing controversy, and its content will 
disappear from users’ devices. Kindle Worlds works aren’t available in print, 
so any suppression will be total, hard to document, and perhaps even 
 
 87. Alter, supra note 83 (reporting that James made an estimated $95 million in 2013). 
 88. Abigail De Kosnik, Should Fan Fiction Be Free?, 48 CINEMA J. 118, 119–20 (2009). 
 89. See id. 
 90. See, e.g., Pete Cashmore, Amazon Accused of Removing Gay Books from Rankings, 
MASHABLE (Apr. 12, 2009), http://mashable.com/2009/04/12/amazon-accused-of-
removing-gay-books-from-rankings/ (describing previous controversy over Amazon making 
LGBT content harder to find); Adam L. Penenburg, Amazon’s Monster Porn Purge, 
PANDODAILY (Jan. 1, 2014), http://pando.com/ 2014/01/01/amazons-monster-porn-
purge/ (describing Amazon’s fluctuating bans on unusual sexual content based on its 
prohibition of “pornography” and “offensive depictions of graphic sexual acts”). 
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unnoticed, unlike suppression of a printed work, where copies may survive 
the censor’s sweep.91 
Each copyright owner may impose an additional set of limits, which 
makes prediction about content rules even more difficult. For example, 
Bloodshot ’s “world” includes multiple restrictions, from standard bans on 
“erotica” and “offensive content” to the vague requirement that characters 
be “in-character,” along with bans on “profane language,” graphic violence, 
“references to acquiring, using, or being under the influence of illegal drugs,” 
and “wanton disregard for scientific and historical accuracy.”92 In G.I. Joe 
works, meanwhile, the character Snake Eyes can’t be portrayed as a Yankees 
fan.93 While this control is perfectly appropriate from the perspective of 
copyright owners claiming absolute rights over their works,94 it also 
suppresses the most transformative and critical reworkings.  
In addition, Amazon requires writers to be at least eighteen years old, 
excluding the many young people who discover, and benefit so much from, 
creative fandom. Lawyers may consider such restrictions routine because of 
minors’ inability to contract unvoidably, but in the unlicensed, 
noncontractual worlds of fandom, young people are often the most active 
participants, discovering their artistic talents for the first time. Many of the 
benefits that writing in an existing world can offer, in terms of developing 
literacy and other skills, are particularly valuable for younger creators.95 
Young writers often lack access to supportive communities; in 
noncommercial fan-fiction communities, others’ enthusiasm for the shared 
world translates into assistance with writers’ development, since everyone 
wants more stories.96 But who would routinely pay money to help a writer 
develop and improve her skills? When markets are involved, we are rarely 
happy paying for someone else’s training, and we usually consider our money 
payment enough without additional feedback to assist artistic improvement. 
But Kindle Worlds does not allow authors to circulate works for free, even if 
young authors were allowed to use it. 
 
 91. See Brad Stone, Amazon Erases Orwell Books from Kindle, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2009, 
http:// www.nytimes.com/2009/07/18/ technology/companies/18amazon.html (reporting on 
an earlier instance of Amazon’s content erasure). 
 92. See Bloodshot, KINDLE WORLDS, https://kindleworlds.amazon.com/world/
Bloodshot/ (last visited May 21, 2014). 
 93. Alter, supra note 83. 
 94. See Copyright Alliance, supra note 79, at 6 (claiming falsely that copyright law always 
protects creators “from having their works used in advertising against their will, to cast them 
in an unflattering light, or by groups or individuals morally or politically opposed to them”) 
(footnotes omitted). 
 95. See OTW NTIA COMMENTS, supra note 52, at 38–61. 
 96. See id. 
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Kindle Worlds additionally requires works to be of a certain length, 
which is understandable for a commercial enterprise but deadly for social 
practices that thrive on spontaneity, experimentation, and flexibility. 
Although fannish poetry has a long history, there will be no Vampire Diaries 
sonnets on Amazon. The innovations of noncommercial remix are unlikely 
to take root in such sanitized soil. As media scholar Catherine Tosenberger 
argues, fanworks are meant to be “unpublishable,” which leaves their 
creators free to disregard traditional publishing conventions. This lack of 
commercial consequence 
allows people to stake claims over texts that they wouldn’t normally 
be allowed to if they wanted to publish, and frees them to tell the 
stories they want to tell. You can do things in fanfiction that would 
be difficult or impossible to do in fiction intended for commercial 
publication, such as experiments with form and subject matter that 
don’t fit with prevailing tastes . . . . It’s a way of asserting rights of 
interpretation over texts that may be patriarchal, heteronormative, 
and/or contain only adult-approved representations of children 
and teenagers.97 
It’s in these unpublishable works that new types of creativity and 
otherwise marginalized creators are free to develop. We don’t know what 
other new forms Amazon’s content, age, and format restrictions will 
preclude—and that’s the problem. 
 
 97. Henry Jenkins, Gender and Fan Studies (Round Five, Part One): Geoffrey Long and 
Catherine Tosenberger, CONFESSIONS OF AN ACA-FAN (June 28, 2007), http://
henryjenkins.org/2007/06/gender_and_fan_studies_round_f_1.html; see also Henry Jenkins, 
Gender and Fan Studies (Round Five, Part One): Geoffrey Long and Catherine Tosenberger, 
CONFESSIONS OF AN ACA-FAN (June 28, 2007), http://henryjenkins.org/2007/06/
gender_and_fan_studies_round_f_1.html; Catherine Tosenberger, Potterotics: Harry Potter 
Fanfiction on the Internet 34–35 (2007) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Florida), available at http://ufdc.ufl.edu/UFE0019605/00001 (“[F]andom is a space where 
freedom to read and write whatever one wants are felt in a much more concrete way than in 
more ‘official’ spaces. . . . Fanfiction is, in many ways, given life by what other spaces don’t 
allow.”); Timothy B. Lee, Ars Book Review: “Here Comes Everybody” by Clay Shirky, ARS 
TECHNICA (Apr. 3, 2008, 10:17 AM), http://arstechnica.com/articles/ culture/book-review-
2008-04-1.ars/3 (discussing in an interview with Clay Shirky valuable group productions 
whose transaction costs mean that they can only take place voluntarily, outside the market 
and the firm); Liz Gannes, NTV Predictions: Online Video Stars, GIGAOM (Dec. 30, 2007, 9:00 
AM), http://gigaom.com/2007/12/30/ntv-predictions-online-video-stars/ (“Fans, 
operating outside of the commercial mainstream, have the freedom to do things which 
would be prohibited [to] those working at the heart of a media franchise—explore new 
stories, adopt new aesthetics, offer alternative interpretations of characters, or just be bad in 
whatever sense of the word you want. And much of the online video content thrives because 
it is unpublishable in the mainstream but has strong appeal to particular niches and 
subcultures.”) (quoting Henry Jenkins; alteration in original). 
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2. Commodification: Undermining the Creative Spirit of Communities  
Corralling fan fiction into Amazon’s ecosystem would exclude a huge 
amount of creative energy, and many opportunities for educational and 
creative development would be lost. But even if, counterfactually, Kindle 
Worlds provided creative freedom, the context of a paid platform would still 
work additional changes on the creative environment—distortions in 
incentives that change the substance of the works created, and distortions in 
the overall “market” for creative works. Getty embeds and Content ID 
already raise issues of “digital sharecropping,” enabling large corporations to 
profit from the uncompensated creative labor of individual producers. But 
Amazon’s version of monetization, which offers creative individuals a small 
share of the proceeds, is not an adequate alternative—certainly not as a 
substitute for fair use. 
Creativity, though it often comes from individuals, always arises from a 
context, and can’t be understood without attention to creators’ 
communities.98 The basic issue with monetizing fan fiction is that organic, 
noncommercial communities that create transformative remixes cannot 
move into the commercial sector without being fundamentally altered and 
diminished.99 The market changes what it swallows.  
Begin with the consumption side: extensive research has shown that 
people behave differently when they don’t have to pay money for a benefit.100 
 
 98. See R. KEITH SAWYER, EXPLAINING CREATIVITY: THE SCIENCE OF HUMAN 
INNOVATION 209 (2d. ed. 2012) (“Individual-level explanations are the most important 
component of the explanation of creativity . . . . But individuals always create in contexts, 
and a better understanding of those contexts is essential to a complete explanation of 
creativity.”). 
 99. See OTW NTIA COMMENTS, supra note 52, at 62–75; Henry Jenkins, Afterword: 
Communities of Readers, Clusters of Practices, in DIY MEDIA: CREATING, SHARING AND 
LEARNING WITH NEW TECHNOLOGIES 231, 239 (Michele Knobel & Colin Lankshear eds., 
2010) (“Many web 2.0 sites provide far less scaffolding and mentorship than offered by 
more grassroots forms of participatory culture. Despite a rhetoric of collaboration and 
community, they often still conceive of their users as autonomous individuals whose primary 
relationship is to the company that provides them services and not to each other.”). 
 100. See DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE 
OUR DECISIONS 55–74 (2008) (describing research); David Adam Friedman, Free Offers: A 
New Look, 38 N.M. L. REV. 49, 71–81 (2008) (same); Kristina Shampanier et al., Zero as a 
Special Price: The True Value of Free Products, 26 MARKETING SCI. 742, 745–48 (2007) 
(explaining the “zero price effect,” in which demand increases for chocolate candy reduced 
from one cent to free, but decreases for an inexpensive but higher-quality alternative when 
its price is also reduced by one cent but not to zero); see also ANDERSON, supra note 70 
(book-length treatment of the power of “free”); Dan Ariely, The Power of Free Tattoos, 
DANARIELY (Nov. 10, 2010), http://danariely.com/2010/11/10/the-power-of-free-
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Paying a single penny can change behavior substantially, even though it’s 
essentially equivalent to zero in rational economic terms: “If you charge a 
price, any price, we are forced to ask ourselves if we really want to open our 
wallets. But if the price is zero, that flag never goes up and the decision just 
got easier.”101 With fan fiction, that means people consume more—and 
differently—when they can read for free. Any argument that free fan fiction 
substitutes for what could otherwise be paid purchases ignores that 
significant difference in decision-making. 
“Free,” in increasing consumption, also decreases concern for quality.102 
This change in preferences of course has downsides, but it also lowers 
barriers to entry for new creators by providing an enthusiastic and often 
quite forgiving audience. And since the usual path to good art involves 
producing bad art first, this tolerance benefits the quality and variety of 
creative expression in the long run. “Free” triggers gift and reciprocity 
norms, which in the context of creative production support the development 
of community through feedback, discussion, and the encouragement of 
further participation as creators respond to each other. 
Other profound effects of noncommerciality operate more directly on 
creators. The empirical evidence indicates that noncommercial production in 
a digital economy is not just detached from monetary exchange, but that it 
can be subject to crowding out: noncommercial motives can be eliminated 
when money is on offer, leading to less overall creativity and less social 
benefit.103 Studies of creativity have shown that extrinsic rewards regularly 
diminish creative motivations and the creativity of the resulting works, as 
 
tattoos/ (concluding that “free” overwhelmed other potential concerns for consumers even 
for permanent changes such as tattoos). 
 101. ANDERSON, supra note 70, at 59. 
 102. ARIELY, supra note 100, at 58. 
 103. See, e.g., YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL 
PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 94–95 (2006) (“Across many 
different settings, researchers have found substantial evidence that, under some 
circumstances, adding money for an activity previously undertaken without price 
compensation reduces, rather than increases, the level of activity.”); Yochai Benkler, Sharing 
Nicely: On Shareable Goods and the Emergence of Sharing as a Modality of Economic Production, 114 
YALE L.J. 273, 323–24 (2004) (“A simple statement of this model is that individuals have 
intrinsic and extrinsic motivations. . . . Extrinsic motivations are said to “crowd out” intrinsic 
motivations because they (a) impair self-determination—that is, a person feels pressured by 
an external force, and therefore feels overjustified in maintaining her intrinsic motivation 
rather than complying with the will of the source of the extrinsic reward; or (b) impair self-
esteem—they cause an individual to feel that his internal motivation is rejected, not valued, 
leading him to reduce his self-esteem and thus to reduce effort.”); Bruno S. Frey & Felix 
Oberholzer-Gee, The Cost of Price Incentives: An Empirical Analysis of Motivation Crowding-Out, 87 
AM. ECON. REV. 746, 746 (1997). 
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judged by objective evaluators. People in commercialized environments seem 
to focus on the extrinsic reward, not on any enjoyment they might have 
gotten from performing the creative activity.104 But not all extrinsic rewards 
are the same. Money often decreases intrinsic creative motivation, while 
positive feedback—the “currency” used in fan communities—enhances 
intrinsic motivation.105 Fandom has long operated as a “gift economy.”106 
People who enjoyed a fanwork are expected or exhorted to give feedback 
and thanks, and within a community, people regularly make fanworks for 
each other. These nonmonetized rewards can be understood as incentives, 
but they have qualitatively different effects than money.  
In the words of Cyndi Lauper, money changes everything. Sociologist 
Viviana Zelizer explains that defining an activity as noncommercial changes 
how people feel and reason about it compared to activities defined as 
commercial.107 Specifically, money is corrosive of communities whose 
members support each other: 
It turns out that when [experimental] participants are paid with 
goods that have clear monetary value but are not mediums of 
exchange—like candy—they favor equal distribution [for work 
they’d done as a group], and everyone gets the same share. When 
participants are compensated with money, they favor a 
compensation scheme in which everyone gets a share proportional 
to the work he or she accomplished. As [Barry] Schwartz notes, 
“Human beings are ‘unfinished animals’; what we can reasonably 
expect of people depends on how our social institutions ‘finish’ 
them.”108 
Money encourages people to think of themselves as autonomous actors, and 
also to think of others that way, which means that they have less impetus to 
 
 104. See, e.g., Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Copyrights As Incentives: Did We Just Imagine 
That?, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 29, 50–53 (2011) (reviewing empirical evidence). 
 105. See Edward L. Deci, Effects of Externally Mediated Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation, 18 
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 105, 114 (1971); cf. Karim R. Lakhani & Robert G. Wolf, 
Why Hackers Do What They Do: Understanding Motivation and Effort in Free/Open Source Software 
Projects, in PERSPECTIVES ON FREE AND OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE 1, 3 (J. Feller et al. eds., 
2005) (“We find . . . that enjoyment-based intrinsic motivation—namely, how creative a 
person feels when working on the project—is the strongest and most persuasive driver.”).  
 106. See Karen Hellekson, A Fannish Field of Value: Online Fan Gift Culture, 48 CINEMA J. 
113, 117 (2009) (noting that fandom’s gift economy is both protective against legal claims 
and a way for fan communities to preserve their “own autonomy while simultaneously 
solidifying the group”). 
 107. See VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, THE SOCIAL MEANING OF MONEY (1994). 
 108. EVGENY MOROZOV, TO SAVE EVERYTHING, CLICK HERE 304 (2013) (citing Barry 
Schwartz, Crowding Out Morality: How the Ideology of Self-Interest Can Be Self-Fulfilling, in 
IDEOLOGY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND LAW 160, 181 (Jon Hanson & John Jost eds., 2012)). 
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support other people. Experimental research has shown that evoking the 
concept of money, compared to evoking neutral concepts, leads people to 
ask for less help and to be less willing to help others. People primed with the 
concept of money “preferred to play alone, work alone, and put more 
physical distance between themselves and a new acquaintance.”109 These 
effects can occur even when people aren’t consciously aware of the 
changes.110 Once money is in the picture, being reminded of community in 
the form of friends and family doesn’t help; money still leads to greater 
preferences for distance from others.111 
Relatedly, the way in which money enters a relationship matters. One 
benefit of a market system is that people don’t need to be friends with the 
butcher and the baker to get food at the standard price. This is an important 
freedom—but it also makes relationships less durable, compared with 
relationships in which rewards take the form of entitlements or gifts.112 
Kindle Worlds is a transactional, atomized economy: a reader pays a set price 
and receives a set amount of content in return. Mel Stanfill notes that 
Amazon is addressing fans as individuals only, rather than as people who 
understand themselves as being committed to a larger community. As she 
notes, Kindle Worlds “is part of a broader shift to incite fans-the-
individuals . . . to ever greater investment and involvement but manage them 
through disarticulating them from the troublesome resistive capacity of 
fandom-the-community.”113 
 
 109. Kathleen D. Vohs et al., The Psychological Consequences of Money, 314 SCIENCE 1154, 
1154, 1156 (2006) (“Relative to people not reminded of money, people reminded of money 
reliably performed independent but socially insensitive actions. The magnitude of these 
effects is notable and somewhat surprising, given that our participants were highly familiar 
with money and that our manipulations were minor environmental changes or small tasks 
for participants to complete.”) (citations omitted). 
 110. Kathleen D. Vohs et al., Merely Activating the Concept of Money Changes Personal and 
Interpersonal Behavior, 17 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 208 (2008) (finding that 
even subtle reminders of money resulted in substantial behavior changes, including making 
people less helpful than others not reminded of money as well as making people work 
harder; reminders could be as subtle as rearranging word tasks where the words referenced 
money, or a screensaver with a picture of money). 
 111. See id. at 210 (finding that reminders about money led to fewer charitable 
donations). 
 112. VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, ECONOMIC LIVES: HOW CULTURE SHAPES THE ECONOMY 
137 (2010) (“On the whole, entitlements and gifts imply a more durable social relation 
between them than does compensation.”). 
 113. Mel Stanfill, Kindle Worlds II: The End of Fandom as We Know It?, MEL STANFILL (June 
3, 2013, 7:48 AM), http://www.melstanfill.com/kindle-worlds-ii-the-end-of-fandom-as-we-
know-it/ (citation omitted); see also Matt Bloomgarden, Fan-Fiction Overview, at 12 
(presentation at copyright law conference by representative of content company participating 
in Kindle Worlds, explaining “strategic benefits” of Kindle Worlds entirely in terms of 
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Given the way in which Kindle Worlds is presented—as a series of 
autonomous transactions—the volume and variety of fan creation will 
predictably be much lower, to the long term detriment of fan culture. Before 
the rise of the Internet, fans of Marion Zimmer Bradley’s groundbreaking, 
popular Darkover universe wrote fan fiction extensively. Following a dispute 
with a fan writer, Bradley purported to ban fan fiction, unless it was 
published in one of the commercial anthologies she edited—a small-scale 
precursor of Kindle Worlds. Fans mostly complied, and Darkover fandom 
entered a downward slide from which it has never recovered.114 The 
experience of American hip-hop likewise shows a decline of experimental 
and political art as the industry converted to an always-license model.115 
Meanwhile, copyright owners that learned not to suppress fan creativity or 
corral it into “authorized” channels continue to have robust and profitable 
fandoms, with prominent examples including Harry Potter, Star Wars, Twilight, 
and Marvel’s comic book universes. Content industries touting the always-
license model are, it seems, eating their own seed corn—at least if fair use 
doesn’t remain a robust alternative. 
So far, Kindle Worlds is behaving as the existing evidence about 
commercialization would lead one to expect, both in volume and content. 
For example, the popular Pretty Little Liars series, created by the book- 
packaging company Alloy, showed forty-six Kindle Worlds works in June 
2014, while there were nearly 6000 such works on the popular Fanfiction.net 
site; the smaller and younger Archive of Our Own hosted over 370.116 At a 
 
copyright owner’s relation to the “fan base,” without mention of community or fan-to-fan 
interaction). 
 114. AARON SCHWABACH, FAN FICTION AND COPYRIGHT: OUTSIDER WORKS AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION 112–14 (2011) (describing the dispute); id. at 116 
(explaining that, after the creative fandom was suppressed, “Darkover . . . faded from the 
prominence it enjoyed in genre fiction in the 1970s and 1980s”). 
 115. Erik Nielson, Did the Decline of Sampling Cause the Decline of Political Hip Hop?, THE 
ATLANTIC (Sept. 18, 2013, 2:18 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/
2013/09/did-the-decline-of-sampling-cause-the-decline-of-political-hip-hop/279791/. 
 116. See FANFICTION, https:// www.fanfiction.net/ tv/Pretty-Little-Liars/ (last visited 
June 26, 2014) (reporting approximately 5700 results for stories based on the TV series); 
FANFICTION, https:// www.fanfiction.net/book/Pretty-Little-Liars-series/ (last visited June 
26, 2014) (reporting 198 results for stories based on the book series); ARCHIVE OF OUR 
OWN, https:// archiveofourown.org/tags/Pretty%20Little%20Liars/works (last visited June 
26, 2014) (reporting 370 results for the TV show); ARCHIVE OF OUR OWN, 
https:// archiveofourown.org/tags/Pretty%20Little%20Liars%20Series%20-%20Sara%20Shepard/
works (last visited June 26, 2014) (reporting 11 results for the book series). Some of this can 
be attributed to time—Kindle Worlds hasn’t been operating for as long as the series has 
been around, while FanFiction.net has been—but not all. The distinctly unpopular 
Ravenswood TV series, which did launch after Kindle Worlds, yields 5 results on Kindle 
Worlds, and a total of 16 on Fanfiction.net—9 Ravenswood stories, and 7 crossovers with 
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more general level, a search on Fanfiction.net’s “Just In” feature117 revealed 
over a hundred stories posted in the last hour. Amazon’s total for all twenty-
four Worlds with content in June 2014, after over a year of availability (plus a 
pre-launch period in which Amazon solicited specific authors to write), was 
538.118 
Kindle Worlds content is very different from the content of traditional, 
unlicensed fan writing: “[w]hen you look at the Kindle Worlds bestseller list, 
there’s virtually no overlap in topic, content, or source material between the 
type of writing people want to pay for on Kindle Worlds, and the type of 
writing that leads more than a million people to flock to [fan-run] Archive of 
Our Own (AO3) each day.”119 Kindle Worlds bestsellers look a lot like other 
bestsellers, with crime fiction, thrillers, and young adult supernatural fiction 
as highly popular genres. By contrast, traditional fan fiction features much 
more in the way of male/male romance, “short stories based around tropes 
like bodyswap or time travel, and multi-chapter adventure stories with lots of 
unresolved sexual tension.”120 And, unlike most fan fiction communities, 
which are largely populated by women or people who don’t identify as men, 
most authors of Kindle Worlds stories present themselves as men.121 
One fan writer offered a useful metaphor: 
After several months of operation, Amazon’s Kindle Worlds 
marketplace does not show the continuous, exciting [user-
generated content] activity of a typical fanfic site. If the website 
were a playground, the Kindle Worlds market would have five 
quiet, clean, polite children carefully playing together while 
helicopter parents hovered overhead. Meanwhile, at the 
community-run fanfic site across the road, mobs of screaming 
children are climbing unsupervised over the swingsets and 
throwing gravel at each other. Whatever Amazon has created, there 
is no life in it. Why is this? 
 
Pretty Little Liars; crossovers as a genre are not allowed on Kindle Worlds. Ravenswood 
FanFiction Archive, FanFiction, https:// www.fanfiction.net/tv/Ravenswood/ (last visited June 
26, 2014); Pretty Little Liars and Ravenswood Crossover, FANFICTION, https:// www.fan 
fiction.net/crossovers/Ravenswood/10913/ (last visited June 26, 2014).  
 117. Just In, FANFICTION, https:// www.fanfiction.net/j/0/0/0 (last visited June 26, 
2014). 
 118. Kindle Store › Kindle Worlds › Worlds, AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/b?node=6118587011 
(follow “+ See more” hyperlink under “Worlds” list in filtering options) (last visited June 26, 
2014). 
 119. Gavia Baker-Whitelaw, Here’s Proof Amazon’s Fanfic Venture is Working, THE DAILY 
DOT (Mar. 3, 2014), http://www.dailydot.com/fandom/neal-pollack-kindle-worlds-fanfic/. 
 120. Id. 
 121. See id. 
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No one goes to Amazon to enjoy themselves or talk with their 
friends. On a real fanfic site, there are writing contests and games, 
other fans to chat with, free daily story updates from your favorite 
authors, instant reviews and “likes” on your work, feedback from 
“beta readers” who provide advice on how to improve your story, 
discussion groups where you can trade ideas with fellow fans, a 
huge free archive of previously published work to browse through, 
constantly updated user blogs, group writing projects, and more. 
Amazon doesn't have any of that. They just sell books.122 
There is, therefore, a connection between Kindle Worlds and other 
attempts to monetize “sharing” and gift economies. They fundamentally 
change the nature of the relations at issue, not only by adding money but also 
by adding hierarchy: someone in charge making the rules, someone who 
profits not by participating but by taking a chunk of the transaction. Instead 
of reciprocity—relations involving thanks, later contributions, mutual 
obligation, and ties extending across time since no one interaction is ever a 
complete relationship—there is an immediate “squaring up” of cash for 
product.123 
This is not to say that writing for money is wrong, or less valuable than 
writing for free. Monetary incentives are often useful,124 and there can be 
community and creativity in paid markets. There is room for dialogue on new 
ways of melding creativity and commerciality. Going forward, if there is to be 
compensation for some forms of fanworks, one crucial issue will be whether 
creators are getting a fair share of the return for subjecting themselves to 
copyright owners’ control.125 
 
 122. NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN., REQUEST FOR COMMENTS ON DEPARTMENT 
OF COMMERCE GREEN PAPER, COPYRIGHT POLICY, CREATIVITY, AND INNOVATION IN 
THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, NO. 130927852-3852-01, COMMENTS OF ANONYMOUS 2–3 (Nov. 
13, 2013), available at http:// www.uspto.gov/ip/global/copyrights/Anonymous.pdf. 
 123. Andrew Leonard, “Sharing Economy” Shams: Deception at the Core of the Internet’s Hottest 
Businesses, SALON (Mar. 14, 2014), http://www.salon.com/2014/03/14/sharing_economy_
shams_deception_at_the_core_of_the_internets_hottest_businesses/. 
 124. See Vohs et al., supra note 110, at 211 (noting that money “leads to a perspective on 
the world that emphasizes inputs and outputs with an expectation of equity” and increases 
striving for results). 
 125. See ZELIZER, supra note 112, at 293 (“We should stop agonizing over whether or 
not money corrupts but instead analyze what combinations of economic activity and caring 
relations produce happier, more just, and more productive lives. It is not the mingling that 
should concern us but how the mingling works. If we get the causal connections wrong, we 
will obscure the origins of injustice, damage, and danger.”). For some good discussions of 
commercializing noncommercial fandom, see, e.g., Nele Noppe, Why We Should Talk about 
Commodifying Fan Work, 8 TRANSFORMATIVE WORKS & CULTURES (2011), 
http:// journal.transformativeworks.org/index.php/twc/article/view/369 (emphasizing that 
commercialization is worth considering only in a context in which the gift economy also 
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For this Article’s purposes, however, the key point is that noncommercial 
fanworks protected by fair use and commercialized fanworks are not 
interchangeable, whether at the individual level or in terms of creative 
communities. There are communities in which intrinsic rewards are both 
important and vulnerable to crowding out by money. Both kinds of 
opportunity, free and paid, should be options, especially for developing 
artists who aren’t able to earn a living in the paid market and can benefit 
disproportionately from other forms of reward. Noncommercial 
communities encourage more creators to enter, as well as more diversity of 
content, than commercial communities (where newcomers are, after all, 
competitors). Licensing’s incentivizing virtues come with costs, so we should 
protect diverse sources of support for creativity—including noncommercial 
communities distinct from market exchanges.  
3. Competition: Distorting the Market for Professional Creative Works 
Kindle Worlds may also have structural effects on the market for 
individual creators. This new form of licensing has the potential to drive 
down the return to authors who do seek to compete in the commercial 
market. Professional writers have noted that rather than being like 
conventional fan fiction, Kindle Worlds is more like the established market 
for authorized tie-in novels for franchises such as Star Trek, Star Wars, and 
the like. But unlike tie-in authors, Kindle Worlds authors need be paid 
nothing in advance.126 Hugo-winning writer John Scalzi sums up his 
concerns: 
I would caution anyone looking at this to be aware that overall this 
is not anywhere close to what I would call a good deal. Finally, on a 
philosophical level, I suspect this is yet another attempt in a series 
of long-term attempts to fundamentally change the landscape for 
purchasing and controlling the work of writers in such a manner 
that ultimately limits how writers are compensated for their work, 
which ultimately is not to the benefit of the writer.127 
 
survives); Suzanne Scott, Repackaging Fan Culture: The Regifting Economy of Ancillary Content 
Models, 3 TRANSFORMATIVE WORKS & CULTURES (2009), http://journal. 
transformativeworks.org/index.php/twc/article/view/150/122 (discussing the risks of 
exploitation through commercial entities’ “regifting” a constrained version of fandom to the 
public). 
 126. John Scalzi, Amazon’s Kindle Worlds: Instant Thoughts, WHATEVER (May 22, 2013), 
http://whatever.scalzi.com/2013/05/22/amazons-kindle-worlds-instant-thoughts/ (noting 
Kindle World’s potentially significant effects on the existing media tie-in market and 
professional writers who participate in that market). 
 127. Id. 
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The Vampire Diaries, a franchise participating in Kindle Worlds, provides a 
lesson in the use of competing pieceworkers to drive down prices to the 
detriment of individual creators and to the benefit of Amazon as middleman: 
Alloy, the packager who owns the rights to the series, initially hired L.J. 
Smith to write the books, but fired and replaced her over creative differences. 
But she still loves the characters she created so much that she’s taken to 
Kindle Worlds to finish the story the way she wanted, even though her 
royalties are low and much of the revenue goes to the company that fired 
her. An Alloy representative’s description of the affordances of Kindle 
Worlds encapsulates the way in which copyright ownership is being used to 
minimize the return to creative contributions: “[o]ne of the benefits of 
Kindle Worlds is that any fan, even the author of the original work, can 
participate.”128 In the new economy, all creators will apparently survive on 
micropayments. (Of course, unpaid fan creativity can also be seen as 
competing with paid writing—but, as I argued above, noncommercial works 
and communities have some significant differences that deserve legal support 
even as we support well-paid creativity as well.)129 
Even if its compensation scheme were closer to traditional royalty 
amounts, Kindle Worlds would be of concern because its exclusivity 
promotes monopolization of the market for creative works.130 Amazon has a 
vested interest in making content exclusive, and thus unavailable to nonusers 
of its platform—the Kindle ebook reader or Kindle app.131 People who post 
 
 128. Alter, supra note 83 (emphasis added). 
 129. Cf. Livia Penn, Two Really Good Reasons Why Kindle Worlds is Bullshit, DREAMWIDTH 
(May 23, 2013, 6:23 AM), http://liviapenn.dreamwidth.org/530961.html (“I keep seeing 
people saying ‘you’ll get 20% to 35% of the profit. And that’s better than nothing!’ (Well, 
sidebar: I don’t get ‘nothing’ from writing fanfic. If you’re not a fanfic writer who shares 
their fic with a community of readers, it would take me another two thousand words to 
explain what you *do* get, but trust me. It isn’t nothing.)”). 
 130. For a general discussion of the monopolizing effect of Kindle exclusivity, given 
Amazon’s enormous share of the e-book market, see Parker Higgins, Accepting Amazon’s 
DRM Makes It Impossible to Challenge Its Monopoly, TECHDIRT (May 28, 2014), 
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140527/11461627373/accepting-amazons-drm-makes-
it-impossible-to-challenge-its-monopoly.shtml. Kindle Worlds content also raises 
preservation issues. While physical books can be preserved by archives and libraries, and 
while there are major efforts to preserve large online sites that are (or have been) freely 
accessible, Kindle Worlds is, like other Kindle content, legally off-limits for preservation. 
Public libraries may license certain Kindle books to provide them to their patrons, but they 
do not own or even deliver the licensed files from their own servers. This is also a 
competition issue in the sense that libraries and archives offer alternatives to market forces 
that discard everything without a sufficient present value, and allow audiences to access 
works even when individual audience members cannot pay.  
 131. Recently, Amazon bought a specialized comics app, Comixology, that was 
successful in bringing in more casual readers—something comics have struggled with for 
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fan fiction online make their works available to anyone around the world 
with Internet access;132 Kindle Worlds authors can only make their works 
available to others within the Amazon universe, and they can’t make their 
stories available for free. People who do want to read more stories about 
their favorite characters, and who might otherwise have gone elsewhere and 
discovered fan communities, may instead be guided into Amazon’s control. 
To the extent that monopolization of delivery and publishing systems is bad 
for authors in general, Amazon’s ambitions are dangerous to all authors. 
III. THERE MUST BE SOME WAY OUT OF HERE 
The previous Part explained that none of these three schemes to replace 
fair use are what they seem. Despite the promises of those who claim that 
licensing could and should supplant fair use, current fair use doctrine remains 
sound even in a pervasively digital world. The always-license model inevitably 
entails pervasive suppression of expression, further threats to privacy and to 
the individual and social benefits of noncommercialized communities, and 
constrained competition. Fair use, in contrast, supports independence and 
variety in individual works and also in the intermediaries and communities 
that support them. 
These examples reinforce some key lessons. First, privately negotiated 
licenses can never be comprehensive.133 Licenses will inevitably leave many 
creators out in the cold, especially noncommercial remixers.134 To claim that 
licenses can replace fair use because some participants within each market are 
willing to license most of the time is to advocate the suppression of all fair 
uses that rely on works that aren’t within the licensing scheme. Getty, 
Google, and Amazon are not outliers in covering only a subset of the existing 
 
decades. Amazon quickly moved to degrade the user experience on Apple devices, 
presumably to make the Kindle relatively more attractive. Gerry Conway, Gerry Conway: The 
ComiXology Outrage, COMICBOOK.COM (Apr. 27, 2014), http://comicbook.com/blog/2014/
04/27/gerry-conway-the-comixology-outrage/. 
 132. Filtering by repressive regimes excepted, though fan fiction often escapes filters. 
Fan fiction based on Western media is highly popular in China. See Liz Carter, Benedict 
Cumberbatch Is a Gay Erotic God in China, FOREIGN POLICY (Nov. 15, 2013), 
http:// www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/15/erotic_benedict_cumberbatch_
fanfiction_in_china. Some bilingual speakers translate English stories for other Chinese-
speaking fans, and native speakers also write their own stories, often at some personal risk 
due to Chinese repression of “pornography” and homosexual content. 
 133. Compulsory licensing, including extended compulsory licensing for orphan works, 
poses different issues. 
 134. OTW NTIA COMMENTS, supra note 52, at 67–69 (discussing unavailability of 
licenses for many forms of content, such as art and photography, and for many specific 
works even within genres in which licensing schemes allegedly exist). 
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content within their respective genres. Even the extremely vague and general 
promises regarding “user-generated content” in the European Union 
initiative “Licences for Europe—ten pledges to bring more content 
online”135 covered only a tiny fraction of the creative industries, whereas 
remix cultures regularly bring in text, audio, video, and visual arts.136 “In the 
music businesses, the one sector of copyrighted content headed to this model 
[of identifying and licensing everything], they are far from perfecting it 
despite nearly a century of good work towards it.”137 As much music as there 
is, there are exponentially more written texts and images. 
Second, the power to suppress retained by each of these models that are 
marketed as available to everyone confirms that privately negotiated licenses 
will always retain censorship rights, thus leaving creators of transformative 
noncommercial works at risk of suppression.138 The works that will be 
suppressed are precisely those that are the most expressive, critical, and 
necessary.139 Licensors repeatedly tell prospective creators that they are 
supposed to “celebrate the story the way it is”140 and “stay within the lines” 
of the copyright owner’s coloring book.141 Classic defenses of fair use often 
 
 135. Licences for Europe, EUROPEAN COMMISSION 6 (Nov. 13, 2013), http://
ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/licences-for-europe/131113_ten-pledges_ 
en.pdf. 
 136. DEVIANTART NTIA COMMENTS, supra note 35, at 6–7. 
 137. Id. at 31. 
 138. True blanket licensing generally requires either legislative intervention (the statutory 
license for mechanical works) or judicial intervention (the antitrust consent decrees that 
shape ASCAP and BMI licensing). 
 139. OTW NTIA COMMENTS, supra note 52, at 69–71; see also, e.g., MARK DUFFETT, 
UNDERSTANDING FANDOM: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF MEDIA FAN CULTURE 
176 (2013) (“Elvis Presley Enterprises offers another example of a media organization that 
has incorporated and licensed fan creativity on one hand—adding fan art at Graceland and 
turning fan artist Betty Harper’s sketches into postcards—and simultaneously attempted to scotch 
or rein in fan expressions when they ran counter to its financial interest.”) (citing TIM WALL, 
STUDYING POPULAR MUSIC CULTURE 205–10 (2003)); Julie Levin Russo, User-Penetrated 
Content: Fan Video in the Age of Convergence, 48 CINEMA J. 125 (2009) (discussing earlier 
experiments with domesticating fanworks, including fanworks for Battlestar Galactica). 
 140. Simone Murray, “Celebrating the Story the Way It Is”: Cultural Studies, Corporate Media, 
and the Contested Utility of Fandom, 18 CONTINUUM: J. MEDIA & CULTURAL STUDIES 7 (2004). 
 141. The Amazing Fan-Powered Media Event, FANLIB 3, http://fanlore.org/w/images/4/
42/FanLib_info.pdf (from marketing material for a for-profit, licensed-material-only site 
released in 2003) (accessed June 19, 2014): 
MANAGED & MODERATED TO THE MAX 
All the FANLIB action takes place in a highly customized environment 
that YOU control.  
As with a coloring book, players must “stay within the lines” 
Restrictive player’s terms-of-service protects your rights and property 
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focus on the individual uses that are banned by copyright owners. Although 
those uses may constitute a shrinking percentage of remixes in a license-
everything world (bans on portraying a G.I. Joe character as a Yankees fan 
notwithstanding) simply because digital technologies have massively 
increased the total number of remixes, the impact of the most critical uses 
can be outsized. Thus, it’s still important to support transgressive reworkings, 
such as Alice Randall’s rewriting of Gone with the Wind to address the racism 
and sexual politics of the original.142  
Third, creators benefit from the ability to escape pervasive data collection 
and excessively sanitized content platforms. People produce different kinds 
of works when they believe themselves to be under scrutiny.143 A journal kept 
in school so that the teacher can read it will differ in content from letters to 
friends. A Kindle Worlds novella, for which the author can only be paid by 
handing over her real name and contact information to Amazon, or a post 
whose content hinges on a Getty embed, will be crafted with awareness of 
the controlling party, at least in the back of the creator’s mind. Fair use 
enables creators to set themselves free of copyright owners’ surveillance. 
Fourth, fair use protects competition compared to a licensing-only world. 
A more standard competition story in copyright is about devices: fair use 
enabled Sony to escape liability as the manufacturer of the VCR, a device 
with substantial noninfringing uses. (It’s worth noting that one of the 
alternatives to fair use suggested by Sony’s opponents was some sort of 
blanket licensing scheme.)144 The VCR then proved a huge economic boon 
to the movie industry, even as Sony’s Betamax technology fell to the more 
flexible VHS. Freedom spurred innovation as competitors fought in the 
marketplace. By contrast, devices that existing content industries controlled 
have usually been so weighted down with anti-consumer features that they 
fail. When was the last time you used a digital recorder subject to the Audio 
Home Recording Act and its mandatory royalty scheme?145 
 
Moderated “scene missions” keep the story under your control 
Full monitoring & management of submissions & players 
Automatic “profanity filter” 
Completed work is just 1st draft to be polished by the pros. 
 142. Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 143. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 
52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1425 (2000); Sonia K. Katyal, Privacy vs. Piracy, 7 YALE J.L. & TECH. 
222, 316–34 (2005); Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 493–94 
(2006). 
 144. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 972 (9th Cir. 
1981). 
 145. See Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1010 (2012). 
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Fair use has other competition-protecting features as well. Licensing 
protects monopolies by creating higher barriers to entry than fair use. For 
example, when Google was sued for scanning hundreds of thousands of 
library books, it initially supported a settlement that required it to pay 
licensing fees, but that was rational for many reasons, including the fact that 
it created significant barriers to entry for potential competitors.146 By 
contrast, the finding that scanning in order to create snippets and analyze the 
books for content was fair use allows other entities to do the same thing,147 
even though most probably won’t have Google’s resources. 
Finally, these new initiatives to control all uses have made more salient 
the fact that monopolies aren’t just bad for welfare in general; they’re bad for 
creators. When we defend fair use, it is also necessary to consider 
communities of practice, from which many fair uses arise.148 Shakespeare 
emerged from a vibrant community of playwrights and actors. Most likely, so 
will his next successor. Widespread, freewheeling environments in which 
everything is up for reuse and transformation are what enable the best 
creators to learn and succeed. If only the most transgressive and unpopular 
themes can escape licensing, then even if they successfully do so, their 
creators will be isolated from the interactions and incentives that a larger 
community of transformative users can offer. 
Alternative, unlicensed forms of infrastructure, not just individual works, 
are important for creative freedom. A blogger on WordPress can format and 
transform images she uploads any way she likes, and can swap tips and tricks 
with others like her to improve her work—unless Getty embeds take over. 
Specialized video sites with subcultural or niche appeal can use the DMCA to 
protect against copyright liability and allow the development of fair use and 
other norms—unless Content ID screening becomes a requirement.149 As 
Francesca Coppa, one of the founders of the nonprofit Organization for 
Transformative Works, says: 
 
 146. Ariel Katz, Fair Use for the Google Goose; Fair Use for the Book Gander, ARIEL KATZ 
(Nov. 26, 2013), http://arielkatz.org/archives/2992/. 
 147. See Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 148. See PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE & PETER JASZI, RECLAIMING FAIR USE: HOW TO PUT 
BALANCE BACK IN COPYRIGHT (2011); Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to 
Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1525 (2004). 
 149. See IN MEDIAS RES, http://mediacommons.futureofthebook.org/imr/ (curated 
scholarly collection of significant multimedia works, including video); cf. Darnell Witt, Staff 
Blog: Copyright Match on Vimeo, VIMEO (May 21, 2014), https:// vimeo.com/blog/post:626/ 
(discussing video site Vimeo’s recent decision to go beyond the DMCA and filter audio 
content, with an appeals system for mistaken decisions whose contours are as yet 
undefined). 
1447-1488_TUSHNET_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/12/15  5:42 PM 
1486 BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 29:1447  
Today, when I talk about the importance of fan writing, I don’t just 
mean fiction and nonfiction: I mean contracts and code. In the old 
days, fans self-published their fiction . . . , they distributed their 
own VHS cassettes and digital downloads, and they coded and built 
their own websites and created their own terms of service. Today, 
enormous commercial entities—YouTube, Amazon, LiveJournal, 
Wattpad, Tumblr—own much of this infrastructure.150 
As Coppa points out, none of these new services  
has anything like the track record of the average fandom or fannish 
institution; consider how much younger they are than Sherlock 
Holmes, Doctor Who, or even Supernatural fandom [which began 
in 2004]. In the best case, these companies may fail and become a 
disruptive force in relatively stable and long-term communities; in 
the worst case, they may exploit and betray their users.151 
The Internet is littered with the corpses of business models that were 
supposed to last a very long time—including models specifically designed to 
exploit noncommercial creativity.152  
When a gold rush ends, the result is stripped hills and ghost towns, not 
communities and thriving ecosystems. The new licensing gold rush risks the 
same consequences if we don’t defend permissionless alternatives to 
licensing. Current doctrine correctly recognizes that copyright owners’ 
willingness to license, control, or monetize a use does not mean that the use 
is unfair if unauthorized. Indeed, even countries that don’t have a fair use 
defense have increasingly recognized the merits of protecting certain 
unauthorized uses. In the United Kingdom, for example, the government 
proposed to change copyright law to make clear that the availability of a 
license isn’t an absolute bar to certain unauthorized uses. Other factors are 
also relevant to whether a use constitutes a permissible fair dealing: “the 
terms on which the licence is available, including the ease with which it may 
be obtained, the value of the permitted acts to society as a whole, and the 
 
 150. Francesca Coppa, Participations: Dialogues on the Participatory Promise of Contemporary 
Culture and Politics, 8 INT’L J. COMM. 1069, 1072 (2014). 
 151. Id. 
 152. See, e.g., FANLIB, http://fanlore.org/wiki/FanLib/ (last visited May 14, 2014) 
(recounting the launch, and subsequent disappearance, of a venture capital-funded initiative 
designed to commercialize fan fiction on behalf of content owners and allow fan authors to 
win content owner-run sweepstakes). Lucasfilms once offered Star Wars fans free web space 
on starwars.com, as well as “unique” authorized content for their sites, but only under the 
condition that whatever they created would be owned by the studio. See HENRY JENKINS, 
CONVERGENCE CULTURE 152, 156–57 (2006). Today, starwars.com still exists, but the free 
web space for fans is gone. 
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likelihood and extent of any harm to right holders.”153 Thus, the government 
rejected the argument that the “mere availability of a licence should 
automatically require licensing a permitted act.”154 
Despite copyright owners’ claims that this time is different, we’ve seen 
this show before. Markets are transforming, as they regularly do. But fair use 
shouldn’t contract in response. 
 
  
 
 153. Modernising Copyright: A Modern, Robust and Flexible Framework, U.K. GOVERNMENT 
13 (2012), http://www.ipo.gov.uk/response-2011-copyright-final.pdf. 
 154. Id. 
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